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ABSTRACT 
 
Comparing Public Policies in Multilevel Governance Systems:  
Tobacco Control in the European Union. (May 2007) 
Holly Thompson Goerdel, B.S., Texas A&M University 
Chair of Advisory Committee:  Dr. Kenneth J. Meier 
 
 
 This is a comprehensive study of tobacco control policy and politics in the 
European Union, 1970-2000. I develop an instrumental theory of public policy which 
establishes an approach for connecting policy instruments to policy outcomes. I 
investigate ways in which political, bureaucratic and interest group (particularly the 
tobacco industry) factors influence the success of policy instruments aimed at reducing 
cigarette consumption. I also explore whether and how supranational mandates and 
directives influence the success of national-level efforts to control tobacco. I test 
hypotheses empirically using pooled time-series methodologies.  
 The substantive conclusion is that non-price policies are only a qualified success 
when controlling for addiction, price policy and factors in the policy environment. Price 
policy is consistently effective, cross-nationally and the public health bureaucracy is a 
key player in curbing consumption of cigarettes. Major theoretical conclusions include 
affirmation that supranational policy actions can shape national policy outcomes, that 
interest group pluralism favors those with a comparative advantage in organizing (in this 
 iv
case, the tobacco industry), and that while policy instruments can be evaluated according 
to their behavioral attributes, caution should be exercised when simultaneous policy 
adoption is occurring. 
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CHAPTER I   
INTRODUCTION 
 
Tobacco Control in the European Union 
 Over the past thirty years tobacco consumption and control have been of 
political, social and economic interest. Across the developed world, considerable 
political conflict over tobacco control has been generated regarding regulation, taxation, 
consumer protection, and public health (Studlar, 2002). Cigarettes have become the 
target of national sin-tax policies, production and manufacturing of tobacco has been 
under scrutiny, and there has been an increase in the distribution of scientific 
information linking tobacco consumption with numerous health conditions, including 
several cancers ending in death  (for example, 1964 U.S. Surgeon General’s Report and 
numerous European white papers between 1995-2005). Socially, cigarette smoking has 
been labeled a nuisance among patrons of private establishments as well as by 
employees and visitors of public venues such as parks, trains and government buildings. 
The result has been an explosion of policies to govern the harmful effects of 
environmental tobacco smoke (ETS) in social environments, both public and private. 
 These developments have changed the political and social discourse surrounding  
___________ 
This dissertation follows the format of the American Journal of Political Science. 
 
 2
 
state regulation of harmful commodities which put public health at risk. Specifically,  
they have given rise to comprehensive plans of action to curb smoking, in particular,  
across the European Union. These plans have both member state and supranational 
origins.   
A number of commissioned studies from international organizations (e.g., the 
World Health Organization and the World Trade Organization) have also been catalysts 
for igniting discourse on measures for reducing smoking among various target 
populations. Their efforts include outlining proposals for abolishing tobacco advertising 
and promotion, altering public attitudes towards smoking, preventing tobacco 
smuggling, and supporting research on the harmful effects of tobacco smoke (European 
Ministerial Conference, 2002; European Commission on Public Health, 2006). For these 
reasons tobacco politics remains highly salient to citizens, politicians and those in the 
tobacco industry across Europe.    
From a public health and economics perspective, the expanding list and 
incidence of tobacco-related cancers and diseases across Europe in the last three decades 
also add to existing fiscal healthcare costs facing over-extended, traditional welfare 
states.  These pressures provide another impetus for member state governments across 
the European Union to engage in regulating tobacco as an addictive, dangerous 
commodity. Many of these control efforts require collaborative action between multiple 
levels of governemt, local businesses, and mass publics for successful adoption, 
implementation, and compliance. These are reasons why tobacco control has political 
and policy significance. 
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Purpose of Project  
The purpose of this project is to examine the politics of tobacco, expressed 
through public policy, to understand why certain interventions work better than others in 
curbing the tobacco epidemic. I use a combination of three research approaches 
commonly employed in policy studies: substantive policy area analysis, quantitative 
historical (over-time) analysis, and quantitative cross-sectional analysis. The project is 
comparative, focusing on cross-national policy effectiveness in member states of the 
European Union. The focus on European Union develops implications of regulating 
tobacco in a multilevel governance environment. I develop an instrumental theory of 
policy effectiveness to gauge the comparative impact of tobacco control efforts. 
Analyses are both descriptive and prescriptive in nature. 
 I begin the project in Chapter I by situating my research against the policy 
problem of tobacco consumption. I discuss how the combination of policy research 
approaches can be applied to this policy problem. In Chapter II  I establish how to study 
tobacco policy effectiveness from an instrumental view, drawing on three bodies of 
literature: regulatory policy effectiveness, tools of government action, and frameworks 
of policy typology.  I develop conceptual clarity as to how tobacco control interventions 
can be classified according to type and behavioral attributes. Chapter III examines 
government action on tobacco control from 1970-2000 across fifteen countries in the 
European Union: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, 
Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Netherlands, and the United 
Kingdom. I add to this historical account empirical evidence in support of how tobacco 
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policy instruments often converge on common underlying notions of command-control 
regulation and incentive-based interventions which rely on quality information.   
Using a historical perspective, I catalog 1) the adoption of tobacco legislation and 
2) the use of individual policy instruments within each legislative occurrence, for all 
member states. This descriptive analysis also illustrates how the inventory of common 
instruments (policy scope) has expanded over time.  Chapter IV is a quantitative analysis 
of the effectiveness of both individual and multiple policy instruments at the member 
state level. Policy is generally envisaged as a governance mechanism, and an 
instrumental framework for comparative effectiveness is applied to testing hypotheses 
concerning how policy outcomes respond to various policy efforts when the policy 
environment (bureaucratic, political, interest group and contextual factors) is considered. 
Finally, I evaluate whether policy effectiveness remains robust to strategic positioning 
by prominent actors in the policy environment. 
 Chapter V extends Chapter IV by empirically testing whether Europeanization 
plays a role in constraining or enabling tobacco control policies at the national level. 
Two institutional features of the European Union are identified as critical for policy 
performance related to tobacco control: 1) the way in which EU tobacco directives are 
integrated into national law and lead to harmonization across countries 2) the function of 
policy mandates within a supranational system of policymaking.  I supply direct and 
indirect evidence to support claims of how Europeanization has shaped the tobacco-
policy environment at the national level. Finally, Chapter VI offers substantive and 
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theoretical conclusions articulating the contribution of this project to the study of 
comparative public policy.   
 I argue throughout the study that public policy is one expression of the 
relationship between government and its citizens; it helps negotiate governance between 
state and society.  As such, this study speaks to a larger discourse on democracy and 
public policy (Schneider and Ingram, 1997; Ingram and Mann, 1980), especially policy 
effectiveness. An instrumental theory of policy effectiveness inherently values policy 
performance – holding government accountable for gains and losses associated with 
policies and programs being pursued. This is the force behind considering policy 
outcomes as the dependent variable of interest throughout the study.  Furthermore, the 
selection among policy instruments and the complex political economies surrounding 
subsequent policy systems may have implications for broader democratic governance.  
Concentrating on the regulation of tobacco across Europe is a gateway to confront these 
larger questions and concerns over the role of policy in facilitating democracy in the 
modern state.   
 
Policy Problem 
 The problem of tobacco consumption is multifaceted. National and regional anti-
tobacco movements have increased their presence across Europe, industry alliances have 
become organized and powerful and normative concerns over the taxation of cigarettes 
to generate government revenues have surfaced. Progressive, pro-health interest groups 
have undertaken efforts to overwhelm positive images of smoking by injecting counter-
 6
 
campaigns which tout the harmful health effects of tobacco consumption of any kind, 
but especially smoking (World Health Organization, 1997). As expected, the tobacco 
industry has responded using direct and indirect means to influence policymakers, 
including forging alliances with member states who are amenable to preserving industry-
rights to grow, produce, manufacture, and sell tobacco products for maximum profit 
(Germany, as example) (Aspect Consortium, 2004) . These alliances have influenced the 
degree to which national tobacco policies constrain their actions. They have also 
reinforced the determination of the tobacco industry to become highly integrated into the 
policymaking process. These activities are part of a larger global strategy to expand 
tobacco-markets in those directions with least regulatory resistance (e.g., Central Europe 
and East Europe, East/South East Asia). With the support of legislation providing legal 
grounds for costly litigation in the United States, those in the industry are also protecting 
their interests against such a fate in Europe and in markets reaching the developed world 
(Rabin, 2001).  
 More generally, economic consequences of controlling tobacco, as well as citizen 
and industry responses to regulation, face political actors to various degrees, cross-
nationally. Policymakers at all levels are making crucial decisions on the level of 
national-commitment towards intervening in the marketplace when public health is at 
risk (Meier and Licari, 1998). At the least, there is a rising consciousness of the 
importance of controlling tobacco, especially cigarettes, in the minds of decision makers. 
At the most, the result is a rise in tobacco control generally and an overall expansion of 
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tools used by government to change the initiation and consumption behavior of target 
populations (for example, taxation, information, and command-control tools).  
Another facet of the policy problem deals with the complexity of economic, 
health, and psychological determinants of cigarette smoking. The demand for cigarettes 
has become increasingly inelastic to price increases due to its addictive qualities (Licari, 
2000). This has made cigarette taxation attractive as a source of governance revenue, but 
has sent mixed signals to the public as to whether these actions are exploitive in nature.  
It is questionable whether these policies are pro-health and whether they disadvantage 
poorer segments of the consumption population, who typically have limited access to 
cessation treatments. Finally, tobacco consumption has been historically socially-
constructed as acceptable in some time periods, like most of the twentieth century and 
during wartimes, and as increasingly unacceptable in others, such as the post-1964 
Surgeon General’s Report era (Rabin, 2001). Decoupling tobacco control policy from 
evolving social constructions of cigarette smoking is not reasonable. Any contemporary 
study of policy effectiveness in this arena should acknowledge this shifting context, as it 
helps illuminate the present focus on improving public health. 
The concern over public health is especially poignant for European states with 
large social welfare dependencies. This concern is exacerbated by the half million 
European Union citizens who die due to tobacco-related illness every year, and more 
than triple that amount who suffer from tobacco-related diseases (Aspect Consortium, 
2004). Despite these statistics, policy actions did not begin taking shape through 
legislation until the mid 1980s and early 1990s at the member state level. Initiation of 
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tobacco control from the supranational level did not commence until 1989.  The first 
formal authoritative mandate to control tobacco consumption was introduced in the 
Treaty of European Union (TEU). This document was the first official coordinated effort 
outlining a commitment to protect the health and safety of European Union citizens by 
engaging in tobacco control, with the primary goal of curbing consumption of products 
resulting in adverse health effects, or death.     
 
Cigarette Consumption in Europe 1970-2000 
Focusing on tobacco control across member states provides a great deal of 
variation in tobacco consumption and tobacco control policies.  Figure 1 illustrates mean 
cigarette consumption (number of cigarettes per capita, annually) across Europe during 
the decade 1970-1980, by country. The overall range of cigarettes consumed across each 
European country during this decade is between 1250 (Portugal) and 2400 (Greece) 
cigarettes per capita, annually. Greece, the United Kingdom, and Ireland are Europe’s 
highest cigarette consumers, while Sweden, Finland, and Portugal consume, 
on average, one thousand less cigarettes per person than the three consumption leaders. 
Overall cigarette consumption (mean consumption) in European countries is 
approximately 1300 cigarettes per person, annually, in the decade of 1970-1980.    
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FIGURE 1 Average European Cigarette Consumption, Number of Cigarettes 
  Per Capita, Annually:  1970-1980        
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Source: World Health Organization – Health for All Database (2004).  
 
 
In the decade of 1980-1990, Figure 2 demonstrates that overall consumption 
(mean consumption) across European countries rises to approximately 1700 cigarettes 
per capita, annually, from the previous decade. Also, the overall range of consumption 
across Europe widens to between 1300 per person (Netherlands) to 3000 (Greece). The 
United Kingdom and Ireland are replaced by Spain and Belgium as European 
consumption leaders, per capita. Finland and Sweden, however, remain the lowest 
European cigarette consumers.  
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FIGURE 2 Average European Cigarette Consumption, Number of Cigarettes 
  Per Capita:  1980-1990        
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Source: World Health Organization – Health for All Database (2004).  
 
 
 
  
Figure 3 demonstrates how average cigarette consumption varies for many European 
states compared to the previous decade, with some countries reporting substantial 
decreases in consumption ( Sweden, Finland, Belgium, and Italy), while others report 
increases (Spain and Netherlands) or stationary  levels (Austria, France, United 
Kingdom, and Denmark) of cigarette consumption per capita. 
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FIGURE 3 Average European Cigarette Consumption, Number of Cigarettes 
  Per Capita:  1990-2000        
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 Source: World Health Organization – Health for All Database (2004).  
 
 
Taken together these figures demonstrate how cigarette consumption varies 
across both time and space in Europe from 1970-2000. I explain this variation using 
measures of different policy instruments, as well as relevant factors in the policy 
environment.  
 Finally, political scientists care about this policy issue for a number of reasons. 
Tobacco control activities are among the first non-economic regulatory efforts by the 
European Union towards mixed social-regulatory arenas. This progression corresponds 
with goals introduced in the Treaty on European Union (1992), which introduced 
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guiding principles and operating rules to achieve economic, political, and social union. 
Secondly, even with mounting studies linking adverse health consequences to smoking 
over the past two decades, it remains unclear how tobacco can be controlled. This raises 
salient political questions as to the purpose and effectiveness of various tobacco control 
policies across member states and at the supranational level, over time.   
 
Research Orientation for Tobacco Control 
Substantive Case Study  
 This dissertation combines three research approaches to investigate the 
effectiveness of tobacco control policy in the European Union: substantive case study, 
quantitative historical analysis, and cross-sectional analysis. Taken together, these 
approaches inform a comprehensive model of comparative public policy which can be 
exported from the tobacco-health arena to other hybrid, social-regulatory policy areas, 
including regulating the environment, family planning, stem-cell research, and nuclear 
waste disposal.  Hybrid regulatory areas, such as these, inherently require attention to 
both social and economic concerns by policymakers. This dual-feature is often what 
makes them politically salient (Durant and Legge 1993).  
 By focusing on tobacco control as a substantive policy arena, I am able to answer 
three important questions: 1) how can tobacco policy instruments be identified, 
categorized, and analyzed? 2) which factors in the policy environment enable or 
constrain the success of individual and multiple policy efforts? 3) how, and to what 
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extent is policy performance contingent on factors associated with multilevel 
governance?  
 The first question introduces the theoretical orientation of the project, which is 
based on an instrumental view of public policy. Identification and categorization of 
policy instruments shape the foundation of this perspective. First I develop a strategy for 
identifying tobacco policies. Across Europe, tobacco policy activities typically have 
their origins in national policy initiatives. Therefore, I rely on national legislative action 
to identify policies. Secondly, I draw on the policy tools literature (Salamon, 2002; 
Schneider and Ingram, 1990; Meier and Licari, 1998; Studlar, 2002) to categorize 
instruments of tobacco control evident across national legislation, according to whether 
they focus on advertising restrictions, taxation of tobacco products, and/or regulation of 
environmental tobacco smoke, for example. These categories are refined further 
according to their attributes – whether they are command-and-control in nature, 
incentive-based, or designed to correct information asymmetries in the market.  
Ultimately, an instrumental perspective a) improves the exercise of comparing policies, 
cross-nationally and b) supplies expectations of potential relationships between policies 
and outcomes, in the form of testable hypotheses.   
 This information can then be used to address the second question: which factors 
in the policy environment enable or constrain the success of individual and multiple 
policy efforts? This question raises three main points relative to the study of public 
policy: First, evaluating individual policy effectiveness is only useful to the extent that 
no other policies exist targeting the same outcome. Secondly, since we rarely observe 
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such an occurrence in the context of tobacco control, the effectiveness of any particular 
policy must be considered in light of the existing regulatory context (Durant and Legge 
1993).  An instrumental approach takes into consideration both the effectiveness of any 
single policy, warning labels on cigarettes or advertising bans for tobacco, in light of 
existing policies or simultaneously-adopted policies. Thirdly, identifying relevant factors 
in the policy environment is important for understanding how effectiveness is either 
constrained or enabled by bureaucratic, political, interest group, and robust-contextual 
factors.  
 In addition to these, macro-structural factors which fundamentally change policy 
development and implementation should be considered, including an examination of 
how policy performance is affected by supranational features arising from the multilevel 
governance arrangement of the European Union. These features include the extent to 
which integration forces lead to policy convergence across member states, as well as 
how supranational directives are incorporated into national policies.  The way in which 
member states integrate directives into national legislation, for example, can have 
demonstrable effects on policy outcomes (Knill and Lehmkuhl, 2002). Establishing 
incentives for member state compliance at the supranational level, as well as instituting 
standards of suprastate-commitment to certain policy imperatives may also have 
implications for policy performance across the EU. These types of issues should be 
considered when gauging how Europe matters to policy performance in the EU system 
writ large.   
 15
 
 Answers to these questions provide the foundation for a more generalizable, 
comprehensive, and comparative approach to evaluating policy performance in a system 
of multilevel governance. The substantive policy arena of tobacco control is also 
appropriate for exploring these questions like these, generally, due to the prevalence of 
tobacco consumption, and its subsequent control, across every level of government in 
the European Union and around the world.  
 
Quantitative Historical Analysis 
 The second research approach is quantitative historical analysis. This approach 
provides a way to think about the influence of time and space when determining the 
effectiveness of public policy. Social regulatory policies are interventions. These 
interventions can represent new, innovative actions, the reinforcement of past actions, or 
the rescinding of policy activities from the legislative docket. The only chance of 
capturing these dynamics, and how they influence outcomes, is to look at their 
occurrence over time. Tracking new policy interventions while also accounting for the 
continuation of existing policy requires a historical investigation. Having a dataset with 
an over-time dimension provides the necessary mechanism for disentangling those 
factors which influence policy outcomes and it captures the dynamic nature of policy 
effectiveness.  
Taken together, the first two research approaches bring one closer to a theoretical 
and empirical understanding of how to compare public policy and gauge overall 
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effectiveness. To explain why tobacco control works in some instances and not others, a 
third stream of analysis is needed: quantitative cross-sectional analysis.  
 
Quantitative Cross-Sectional Analysis 
It is especially important to consider cross-sectional variation when studying 
public policy.  Cross-sectional analysis of countries which share a historical context and 
similar attributes allows for leverage in exploring the relative impact of factors which are 
likely to vary across space, such as bureaucratic, political, interest group, and robust-
contextual factors relevant to controlling tobacco. Quantitative cross-sectional analysis 
in tobacco control is limited to U.S. states and some U.S. cities (Shipan and Volden, 
2006; Meier and Licari, 1998), as well as across several OECD countries (Licari, 2000). 
The field is wide-open for analyzing member states of the European Union. 
 Taken together, these three research approaches provide an anchor for the 
investigation of research questions throughout the dissertation. While each approach is 
individually important, a comprehensive strategy utilizing all three is necessary for 
better grasping the effectiveness of tobacco control in European Union.  The first step in 
implementing this strategy is to show how my research combines with and contributes to 
existing tobacco control studies in the literature.  
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CHAPTER II  
RESEARCH ORIENTATION FOR TOBACCO CONTROL 
 
Tobacco Control in the Literature 
 The political significance of tobacco control has been expressed a number of 
ways in the literature. Tobacco control studies in political science address a number of 
different research questions and utilize a variety of theories. Most research focuses on 
the United States as a case, with limited attention to comparative U.S. states (Licari, 
1997; Meier and Licari, 1998). More recently, qualitative comparative research has been 
conducted on tobacco control at the U.S. state-level and Canadian provincial-level (see 
Studlar, 2002). In this study, federalism, policy transfer, and interest group factors 
influence adoption patterns of tobacco policy at the sub national and federal levels of 
government. Less attention has been paid to cross-national comparisons outside of these 
cases and it is rare to find a discussion on policy outcomes, rather than policy outputs. 
These deficiencies in the literature are addressed in this dissertation. 
 There are two main political orientations to the study of tobacco control. The first 
deals with political input processes in policymaking. This research focuses on the 
following question: What determines tobacco control policy? The level of analysis is 
often federal, but in some cases reaches to the sub national level. Four theoretical 
approaches are used to explain tobacco control policy: agenda-setting theory, interest 
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group/social movement theory, theories of partisanship and ideology, and political 
institutions.  
Agenda-Setting and Tobacco Control  
The main contribution of research using agenda-setting theory to explain tobacco 
control policy is its ability to clarify difficulties associated with defining the “tobacco-
problem” over the years. Agenda-setting theory is used to explain why governments act 
as they do on policy issues (Studlar, 2002). Baumgartner and Jones (1993) find their 
agenda setting theory explains tobacco control policy over time via the changing policy 
subsystem, dynamic problem definition, and role of policy entrepreneurs (see also Spill, 
Licari, and Ray, 2001). Other agenda setting studies suggest that non governmental 
experts and public health social movements have moved tobacco policy onto the 
political agenda using outside initiatives (Cobb, Keith-Ross, and Ross, 1976). This 
observation is consistent with efforts made by public health interest groups to demand a 
more pluralist approach to curbing the tobacco epidemic – as opposed to the traditionally 
elitist initiatives coming from government officials who are often economically and 
politically connected to pro-tobacco communities (Cobb and Elder, 1972; Downs, 1972; 
Studlar, 2002). Despite these efforts the tobacco industry still exercises a great deal of 
influence in many political decision making spheres. This is due in part to the long-
standing comparative advantage they maintain with organizing in pluralist systems of 
governance versus other anti-tobacco groups.   
 The agenda setting approach also emphasizes the role of entrepreneurial politics 
(Wilson, 1990), where “politically ambitious or morally committed leaders employ 
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modern techniques of mass communication to propose measures in the public interest, 
reframing the way in which social problems are perceived and talked about” (Rabin and 
Sugarman, 2001 p. 13). In tobacco politics, this tactic has proven to be essential to the 
movement of tobacco concerns from the informal to the formal, systemic policy agenda, 
at the federal level in the United States (Baumgartner and Jones, 1993). This strategy has 
helped foster a litigation environment in the U.S. that is hostile towards the tobacco 
industry. These developments provide rather strong incentives for tobacco companies to 
seek markets elsewhere, particularly in areas with the least regulatory constraint and 
more favorable litigation atmosphere. 
 Comparative research on tobacco politics between the U.S. and Canada 
constructs a division of historical periods useful for examining tobacco control policy 
(Studlar, 2001).  This is a useful heuristic which gives context to policy discussions and 
also incorporates important historical information unique to the units of analysis under 
observation. I use this strategy to help build a case for supranational influence over 
national tobacco consumption outcomes. Despite contributions made by agenda-setting 
theory to tobacco control, few applications of the theory have been linked to policy 
performance (Gilmore and McKee, 2004; Rabin and Sugarman, 2001; Studlar, 2001).   
  
Social Movements, Interest Group Conflict, and Tobacco Control 
 The second theoretical approach within the political input-process orientation 
deals with social movements and interest groups. This literature burgeoned in response 
to efforts by public health advocates to organize themselves into a more active 
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relationship with government. One goal of this movement in U.S. and Canadian cases 
was to break apart robust policy subsystems build around the tobacco industry and its 
protection. The idea was to use collective action to promote more pluralist, pro-health 
support while simultaneously weakening pro-tobacco elitism. 
 The outside-initiative exercised by interest groups and social movements began 
to contend with long-standing paths of influence secured by the tobacco industry within 
critical spheres of policymaking. Nathanson (1999), for example, demonstrates how 
social movements act as catalysts for changes in smoking policy . Building on previous 
research Nathanson argues that policy success attributed to health-related social 
movements coincide with credible social and scientific threats to public health, the 
ability to mobilize a diverse, organized constituency, and the convergence of political 
opportunities with target vulnerabilities.  The presence of such factors bolsters policy 
change in a direction towards public health protection and away from tobacco and 
agricultural protectionism.  
 Similar to groups in the environmental movement, anti-tobacco interest groups 
share a normative commitment to protect public health while offering their expertise and 
competency to policy entrepreneurs with respect to scientific and social information 
(Baumgartner and Jones, 1993). In the U.S. , policy entrepreneurs played a key role in 
representing anti-tobacco interest groups as epistemic communities to key policy makers 
(Wilson, 1990; Hays, 1996), emphasizing how the tobacco-problem should be reframed 
according to risks associated with cancer, disease and second-hand smoke (Rabin and 
Sugarman, 2001).  These actions are commonly reflected in policy outputs over time.   
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 Generally, interest group and social movement perspectives consider tobacco 
control an area stimulated by attentive subsets of the public, whether they are interest 
groups, social movements, or advocacy coalitions (Studlar, 2002). Explanations of 
tobacco policy using interest group and social movement theory emphasize the dynamic 
goals of groups, their relative power to alternative interests, and their formal institutional 
connectivity which is most likely through a policy subsystem.  Missing from this 
perspective is the role played by institutions in shaping interest-group integration into 
national policymaking processes. I address this deficiency while also linking institutional 
features to policy outcomes.  
 
Partisanship, Ideology and Tobacco Control 
 Another perspective taken by political scientists to explain tobacco policy  deals 
specifically with political elites and their partisanship and ideology. Tobacco control is 
not typically considered a high-politics issue (Studlar, 2002). Most politicians do not 
incorporate a stance on tobacco issues in their formal policy statements when 
campaigning and political parties do not customarily include such stances in their party 
platforms. Cross-national comparisons between the U.S. and Canada reveal that no 
political parties have made tobacco control a major electoral issue (Studlar, 2002). As 
such, most partisan and ideological conflict over tobacco issues is likely to occur in the 
policy subsystem environment rather than the political forefront. Exceptions are firmly 
grounded in historical context. For example, the rise in tobacco-related litigation at the 
U.S. state-level is partially attributed to attorneys general partisan identification and 
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ideological leanings. Spill, Licari, and Ray (2001) find systematic evidence that 
Democratic attorneys general are more likely to file lawsuits against the tobacco industry 
than their Republican counterparts. The explanation for this relies on understanding the 
historical link between tobacco issues and political party support by the tobacco industry 
in the United States.  
In a comparative context, it is possible to imagine how any stance taken by a 
political party on tobacco issues might be strongly reinforced by features of party 
discipline and accountability that often exist in parliamentary systems of government. 
Political parties, however, rarely take such stances and when they do it is difficult to 
attribute their position to general partisanship and ideology (Studlar 2002).  
 
Political Institutions and Tobacco Control  
 A more promising approach to explaining tobacco control policies across space 
and time involves political institutions. Institutional theory is used to explain tobacco 
policies by focusing on how governmental rules of the game influence policy output. 
This primarily includes the way government is structured and how policy is decided 
(Studlar, 2002). This approach also permeates agenda setting and social movement 
theories, by structuring the way factors inside and outside government influence tobacco 
control and policy change.  
In western developed democracies, qualitative evidence suggests that tobacco 
policymaking, specifically, occurs at the legislative, executive, judiciary, and 
bureaucratic levels of government (Aspect Consortium 2004). For scholars searching for 
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explanatory factors of tobacco policy output, this is a relatively unexplored area in the 
European context. This is surprising given the rich structural variation across national 
governments within the European Union. Points of variation relevant to tobacco control 
are the organization of legislative and executive systems, the constitutionally defined  
system of power between institutional bodies (Kagan and Vogel, 1993; Studlar, 2002), 
the degree of horizontal and vertical fragmentation of political activities, bureaucratic 
policymaking and enforcement styles (Weaver and Rockman, 1993), and the 
organization of court systems.  
Institutional theory is also relevant for establishing how interest groups are linked 
to government and policymaking. This particular linkage is important since the tobacco 
industry and anti-tobacco movements have had varying degrees of interaction with 
governmental units over time which may produce varying results for policy 
performance. 
Tobacco constituencies are also connected to governments in various ways. In 
some countries certain institutional bodies are more connected to the tobacco industry or 
public health movement than others. These differences are likely to influence the shape 
of tobacco control legislation. Studlar (2002) provides a comparative case of this 
theoretical expectation: 
“In Canada, once tobacco control is placed on the formal parliamentary agenda, 
any legislation or budget proposals are highly likely to pass in a form closely resembling 
the original unless the Cabinet chooses to accept changes or allow the bill to die. Thus 
policy responsibility is clearly in the executive even though the tobacco constituency 
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linkages of federal MPs are very similar to those in the United States. Twelve percent of 
the members of the House of Commons had an industry or agriculture presence in their 
district in 1996, almost identical to the rate in the US House of Representatives (Ashley 
et al., 1997)…This same institutional responsibility for tobacco-control legislation has 
been allowed to wither…due to insufficient commitment by the executive of the 
governing party although it may be influenced by its legislative party caucus behind 
closed doors. Tobacco company connections to the executive in Canada, less publicly 
observable…explain [the] tardiness of [restrictive tobacco-control policies] (p. 262).” 
Hypotheses generated in this research suggest that an increased tobacco presence 
(and thus, tobacco constituency) in a country might decrease the likelihood of restrictive 
policies that harm constituents. I incorporate a test of this hypothesis in Chapter IV. 
Refocusing the same hypothesis on anti-tobacco constituents is not likely to make sense 
given their weakness in organizing compared to the tobacco industry (Nathanson, 1999; 
Licari, 2000).  
There is a major shortcoming with applying institutional theories to tobacco 
control. There is an assumption that general institutional features can be easily and 
specifically linked with stances on tobacco issues and formation of tobacco policies. 
These linkages are difficult to track unless the researcher is focusing on a very narrow 
part of the puzzle. A larger piece of the puzzle is explored in this study. In order to 
convincingly use institutional theories, I rely on substantive information coming from 
the policy context, recognizing possible limitations.      
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Policy Typologies, Diffusion, Instruments and Tobacco Control 
  
 The second political orientation to the study of tobacco control progresses from 
input-policymaking processes (agenda-setting, social movements, interest group conflict, 
partisanship, ideology, and political institutions) towards explanations of how policy 
outcomes respond to tobacco control efforts. Systematic investigations of policy 
outcomes in the literature are less comprehensive, less developed, but extremely fertile 
as a research area.  I contribute to this portion of the literature. 
 There is growing concern over how responsive target populations are to 
government action. This concern is based on a number of factors. First, those who are 
targeted by particular policies may disagree with the instrument of regulation. Some 
private businesses such as cafés and bars have not been in favor of abrupt, mandatory 
smoking bans because of how disruptive they are to clientele-expectations and business 
norms. On the other hand, there has been less resistance towards voluntary bans and 
phased-efforts to ban smoking because they allow for adjustments over time. 
 Secondly, the target population may hold a certain preference or attitude towards 
what is considered acceptable in the arena of government intervention. If there is some 
distance between attitudes and regulatory efforts, there may be resistance to comply.1  
Thirdly, the target population may not be in position to respond to government action. 
 
1 I am not able to empirically investigate the role of public opinion in tobacco control given data 
limitations. However, I do incorporate qualitative information relevant to this concern throughout the 
study where appropriate. 
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Given that many tobacco products contain nicotine, addiction plays an important role in 
whether someone is able to adjust their consumption, despite government regulation. 
 All of these factors may influence the success of government action directed 
towards reducing consumption of tobacco products.  They can also be linked to three 
theoretical perspectives used to explain policy outcomes: policy typology, policy 
diffusion, and policy instrument theory.  
 Policy typologies are somewhat descriptive in nature, but can also give rise to 
theoretical expectations linked to outcomes. For example, policies adopted by 
legislatures have long been divided into three major types: regulatory, distributive and 
redistributive (Lowi, 1964).  These typologies “differentiate policies by their effect on 
society and the relationships among those involved in policy formation” (Anderson, 
2000).2   
 Regulatory policies limit the discretion to act of the regulated by imposing 
restrictions or limitations on certain behavior (Mitnik, 1980). Regulatory efforts are 
inclusive of general guidelines that are often expanded into specific actions. Lowi (1972) 
argues that regulatory policies are successful depending on whether government 
coercion is remote or immediate and whether a distinctive pattern of pluralist 
participation allows for appropriate management of policy. Command-control policies, 
such as restrictions on cigarette ingredients represent an example of ‘immediate 
 
2 Policy typologies become linked to outcomes when there is a focus on differentiating policies by their 
effect on society. 
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coercion’. These policies specify sanctions or penalties for noncompliance and establish 
oversight capabilities.  
 Distributive policies are “government efforts to distribute benefits to some 
portion of the population and pay for those benefits from general tax revenues rather 
than with user fees” (Meier, 1993).  Lowi (1972) contends that distributive policies,  
especially subsidies, transfer a more remote likelihood of government coercion. The 
coercive element of subsidies is indirect or is displaced onto the general revenue system. 
On the other hand, distributive policies can promote patterns of elite participation in the 
policymaking process, leading to capture by the regulated  (Lowi, 1972).  This argument 
is salient in the evolution of tobacco control in Canada and the U.S. The promotional 
phase of tobacco control in these contexts was distributive in nature. During this time, 
governments allocated subsidies to tobacco agriculture and refrained from creating 
restrictive policies on manufacturing and consumption (Studlar, 2002). This era of 
distributive policymaking helped forge a culture of government support for tobacco that 
has been difficult to penetrate as time continues.  These developments can be applied 
reasonably well in Europe, especially given extensive national and supranational (e.g., 
CAP subsidy programs) commitments to certain agricultural commodities, including 
tobacco in places like France, England, Germany and Greece. 
 Redistributive policies are more likely to incite political conflict. In redistributive 
policy the government provides benefits for a portion of the population and requires 
another group to pay for these benefits (Anderson, 2000; Meier, 1993).  These policies 
reallocate money, rights, power or values (Anderson, 2000). A recent trend in tobacco 
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taxation reflects how redistributive policies can work in large welfare states. Across 
several European countries more than fifty percent of the price of a pack of cigarettes is 
actually taxation of some kind (Chaloupka and Warner, 1999). Many of these same 
countries are developing specific outlay accounts for these tobacco taxes which are 
designed for recuperation of past and on-going health care costs related to the 
management of smoking-related diseases among their citizens (Aspect Consortium, 
2004). These actions reflect the reallocation of resources from cigarette consumers to the 
state for the purpose of relieving the health care burden. These actions may be more 
symbolic than pragmatic or realistic. There is mixed evidence whether tobacco taxation 
yields enough revenue to cover such expenses (Chaloupka and Warner, 1999). 
 All three types of policies (distributive, regulatory, and redistributive) are evident 
in tobacco control across the United States, Canada, and the European Union.  
 What do policy typologies contribute to an explanation of cross-national 
variation in responses to tobacco control? First, the most important contribution is that 
government intervention into public health and the consumer market place - whether 
distributive, regulatory, or redistributive – fundamentally changes the basic equation of 
tobacco consumption equals market-price plus individual choice. With the expansion of 
tactics used by the tobacco industry both in and out of the political arena to protect their 
interests, it is necessary for government actions to be wider in scope (e.g., regulatory, 
distributive, and redistributive) and more severe in nature (i.e., more bans and 
prohibitions than voluntary agreements) in order to have maximum influence reducing 
cigarette consumption.  
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 Secondly, policies which provide for more immediate government coercion are 
likely to be successful in moving outcomes in a favorable direction.  Finally, distributive 
policies may capture the protectionist history between governments and the tobacco 
industry, while also offering an account of how that history has shaped the way in which 
the tobacco industry has positioned itself in policymaking processes and larger national 
economies across European countries. Tobacco consumption may be unlikely to decline 
under these circumstances. 
 
Policy Diffusion and Tobacco Control.  Policy outcomes may also be influenced 
by the diffusion of policies across time and space. 3 There are three reasons 
intergovernmental diffusion takes place. First, countries learn from one another about 
what does and does not work. Secondly, there may be motivation to compete with one 
another on improving outcomes in a particular area. Thirdly, public and political 
pressures may force the adoption of policies taken by adjacent governments, or those 
with similar characteristics (Berry and Berry, 1999).  
The internal political climate and pressures from the external environment also 
reveal something about how likely policies are to succeed once they are adopted. For 
example, policy diffusion and subsequent success is predicated on the need for policy 
involvement in the first place (Feiock and West, 1993; Ringquist, 1994) the degree of 
interest group support around the issue (Dye, 1966; Hofferbert, 1974; Erikson et al, 
 
3 Policy diffusion theory also explains policy adoption. The link to outcomes is a result of how policies are 
adjusted to account for context.   
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1989; Ringquist, 1994),  the extent to which public and political support is present 
(Berry and Berry, 1999), and the amount of implementation resources available for a 
given intervention (Jacoby and Schneider, 2001; Daley and Garand, 2005).  
Policy diffusion between member states in the European Union is typically based 
on a voluntary mode of governance centered on persuasion (Bulmer and Padgett 2005).  
More coercive variants of policy diffusion apply to decisions negotiated between 
member states and supranational institutions, especially those dealing with policy 
competencies covered in major treaties (Nugent 2001; Bomberg and Peterson 1999). 
While I cannot create a valid measure capturing policy diffusion of tobacco control 
across European countries due to data limitations, I am able to export from this literature 
a number of expectations concerning the types of support necessary for policy success:  
a) Interest group influence. There are two main interest groups contending for 
influence in the tobacco control arena: the tobacco industry and public health 
groups. Since the tobacco industry is smaller and more organized, they have 
comparative advantage when competing for influence than more loosely formed 
public health groups, during the time under investigation (1970-2000).  I consider 
two possible aspects of the interest group environment in shaping tobacco 
consumption in Europe. First, I speculate outcomes are less favorable is those 
countries where the tobacco industry has positioned itself as an important 
contributor to the larger economy. This is based on the assumption that states are 
not likely to pursue policies that compromise their macro economic position, on 
any front. If the tobacco industry has established economic reliance between 
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themselves and the state, it is not likely that policy outcomes will move in the 
direction of decline since the regulatory environment favors the interests of the 
tobacco industry.    
  Secondly, outcomes may be less favorable in those countries where there 
 exist institutions enabling certain interest groups to participate in and exercise 
 influence over policymaking. The tobacco industry is not formally represented in 
 peak organizations of corporatist interest group institutions (Lijphart, 1999) in 
 European countries. Therefore, they rely on more pluralist institutional 
 arrangements for opportunities to exercise influence in policymaking.  I speculate 
 policy outcomes are less likely to decline in countries with pluralist interest 
 group structures. This is based on the assumption that the tobacco industry 
 exercises a comparative advantage in organizing given their resources, over other 
 loosely organized groups competing for influence in similar arenas. I explore the 
 following propositions reflecting these considerations: 
  
 Proposition 1a:4 Policy outcomes are unlikely to decline in those countries 
    where the tobacco industry has positioned itself as an 
    important contributor to the larger economy and has 
    established its  economic relevance to the government. 
  
 
4 The term “policy outcomes”  specifically applies to tobacco consumption in every proposition. When 
policy outcomes respond favorably this means there is a decline in consumption. If policy outcomes are 
unlikely to respond favorably this means they do not decline. I prefer to keep the propositions general in 
nature with respect to language used.  
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 Proposition 1b: Policy outcomes are unlikely to decline in those countries 
    where the tobacco industry has the opportunity to exert 
    influence through pluralist interest-group structures. 
 
b) Implementation resources. Comprehensive tobacco control policies are 
 expensive. They require scientific expertise to form standards of risk and safety,  
 stipulate that oversight be established to monitor compliance in a number of 
 disparate arenas, and they require wide-spread proliferation of information on the 
 dangers of smoking and general tobacco consumption. National bureaucracies, 
 particularly public health bureaucracies, often perform these core functions.
 While there are other subnational participants involved in portions of these 
 efforts, their contributions are difficult to track.5 The public health bureaucracy 
 has the potential to develop and maintain a capacity for responsiveness in the 
 tobacco control arena. Therefore, I focus on the bureaucracy as an 
 implementation resource for controlling tobacco. I explore the following 
 proposition in light of these considerations: 
  
 Proposition 2: Policy outcomes are likely to decline in those countries  
   where implementation resources are available to support tobacco 
   control efforts.  
 
5 When I track these contributions, in one way or another they typically lead back to governmental transfer 
of resources from national health bureaucracies.  
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c) Problem Severity and Need-Based Policy. The core problem with curbing 
 tobacco consumption is the addictive quality of tobacco products, especially 
 cigarettes. Over time, addiction can give way to smoking-related diseases, even 
 death. One way to capture the severity of the addiction problem is through 
 demand elasticity for tobacco products (Chaloupka and Warner, 1999; Meier and 
 Licari, 1998). When consumer demand is unresponsive to changes in price, a 
 degree of addiction is observed. Therefore, habit-persistence plays a key role in 
 determining future consumption. I explore the following proposition in light of 
 this consideration: 
  
 Proposition 3: Policy outcomes are unlikely to decline in countries where  
   addiction is more severe. 
 
 Propositions 1-3 represent how policy outcomes are contingent on interest group 
influence, bureaucratic support, and robust-contextual factors.  
 
Policy Instruments and Tobacco Control  
Compared to more general typologies of regulatory, distributive and 
redistributive policies, policy instruments reflect specific strategies for overcoming 
impediments to policy-relevant action (Schneider and Ingram, 1990). Five broad 
categories of policy instruments are identified by Schneider and Ingram (1990): 
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authority, incentives, capacity-building, symbolic and hortatory, and learning. Each 
makes different assumptions about how policy relevant behavior can be fostered. For 
example, target populations may not respond to calls for change if they believe the law 
has not authorized certain actions, the proper incentives to respond are lacking, or the 
severity of the problem and uncertainty around its solution are unknown. These 
problems can be curtailed using policy instruments which provide authority, incentives, 
or methods of learning (Schneider and Ingram, 1990). I investigate the following 
proposition in light of these considerations: 
This approach is used to identify and categorize tobacco control instruments in 
the literature (Meier and Licari, 1998; Licari, 2000; Pal and Weaver, 2002; Studlar, 
2002). In the U.S. context, Meier and Licari (1998) identify command and control 
regulations, incentives, and information as three prominent and distinct tobacco control 
instruments. They argue these instruments conceptually subsume those previously 
proposed in the literature (for example Schneider and Ingram, 1990; Rose-Ackerman, 
1995; Eisner, 1993). 
Licari (2000) and Pal and Weaver (2002) condense tobacco instruments into 
three categories that are slightly different than Meier and Licari (1998): command- 
control regulation, taxation and education. The particular emphasis on taxation by these 
authors reflects their focus on the role of demand elasticity in frustrating policy efforts 
towards reducing consumption.  
 Studlar (2002) is the first to distinguish more carefully among instruments, rather 
than focus on collapsing categories; in doing so, the complex reality of cross-national 
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government action on combating tobacco is captured.  Five categories of tobacco 
instruments are regulation, finance, capacity-building, education, and learning tools. 
These categories also represent instruments introduced by  previous scholars, such as 
Schneider and Ingram’s (1990) capacity-building and learning tools, Meier and Licari’s 
(1998) regulation, and Pal and Weaver’s (2002) taxation (here, finance). This system of 
categorization is most appropriate for comparing U.S. and Canadian tobacco control 
efforts. It is useful as a template for classifying tobacco control policies across the 
European Union. In Chapter III I identify seven categories of tobacco control 
instruments that can be organized according to how they overcome impediments to 
policy-relevant action. These behavioral expectations are drawn from the policy 
instrument literature, particularly Schneider and Ingram (1990).  I explore the following 
proposition in light of behavioral expectations offered by Schneider and Ingram (1990): 
  
 Proposition 4: Policy outcomes are likely to decline in those countries  
   where policy instruments overcome impediments to policy- 
   relevant action. 
  
 This general proposition includes exploration of more specific policy categories, 
such as command-control policies and those designed to correct information 
asymmetries and uncertainties.  The impact of these instruments on policy outcomes 
may also be dependent on factors coming for the supranational context.  
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 Most supranational directives in the European Union are anchored by policy 
mandates outlined in Union treaties. These mandates can influence national policies in 
three important ways. First, they can establish policy competencies between the EU and 
member states. This means some policy problems become the exclusive responsibility of 
individual member states while others require collective action by all member states. 
Secondly, these mandates create incentives for member state compliance with 
supranational priorities while also conveying the degree of supranational commitment to 
improving policy performance in certain economic, political and social arenas (Nugent, 
1999). Finally, they can lead to harmonization of policy efforts across member states 
which can create efficiency-gains in achieving policy goals. I explore the following 
propositions in light of these considerations: 
 
 Proposition 5: Consumption is likely to decline when national efforts to  
   control consumption occur within a supranational context  
   of compliance and commitment to tobacco control, established 
   through policy mandates. 
 
 Proposition 6: Supranational mandates may lead to the harmonization of tobacco 
   control policies across member states. Consumption is likely 
   to decline in those countries where efficiency-gains are realized 
   through the harmonization process. 
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Developing an Instrumental Theory of Public Policy 
 The purpose of developing and applying an instrumental theory of public policy 
is to provide explanations for why, and under what circumstances, some policies work 
better than others in controlling tobacco consumption. The previous section presents four 
components to this theory. A fifth component is added in this section. 
  First, a strategy is developed for identifying policies. Three key decisions are 
made at this level: which functional policy area will be under investigation, which level 
of government policymaking is most appropriate to target and which expression of 
public policy (e.g., legislation, judicial decisions or bureaucratic rulemaking) captures 
the policy activity of interest to the researcher.  
 Secondly,  a theoretical strategy is used for categorizing policies. Policy 
typologies provide general guidelines for distinguishing among policies. Information 
from the specific policy context provides another way to group like policies into 
categories. Thirdly, policies are characterized according to their behavioral attributes. 
These attributes can be linked to outcomes, depending on whether they are authoritative 
or command-control, as example.  Fourth, the types of support necessary for policy 
success are assessed. This includes a determination of how policy outcomes are 
contingent on interest group influence, implementation resources and problem severity.   
 The fifth component provides a strategy for assessing how policy instruments 
work in combination. Meier and Licari (1998) provide the only empirical study in 
tobacco control of how information and price policies work in combination to influence 
consumption. They develop, test and confirm a formal postulate that the combined 
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contribution of multiple policies can be less than the sum of individual policy 
interventions due to different demand elasticities of the target population to which 
policies are directed. I test this formal postulate in a comparative context and offer 
another suggestion for analyzing combined policy efforts when the likelihood of 
simultaneous policy adoption is high. 
 There are likely a number of policy interventions implemented at the same time, 
across space. This makes collinearity in the estimation process difficult to overcome. 
One strategy for reducing potential collinearity among policies while preserving as much 
behavioral information across instruments as possible is to categorize policies according 
to price and non-price policy bundles. Non-price policy bundles combine interventions 
into one measure of policy scope. While some nuanced behavioral information is traded 
away, the assumption is that the aggregate behavioral quality will enhance policy 
outcomes as the scope of policy interventions increases. I test this extension of policy 
effectiveness when instruments are used in combination. There may be implications 
derived from this strategy for the general application of an instrumental theory of public 
policy. For example, the theory may need to be applied differently depending on the unit 
of analysis under observation, whether policies are studied cross-sectionally and whether 
they are studied over time.  
 To conclude, Blair (2002) observed that policy tools affect policy outcomes in 
predictable and regular ways since they represent the blueprint or template that shapes 
policy. The purpose of developing and applying an instrumental theory of public policy 
is to provide more specific explanations of these processes.  Peters and Van Nispen 
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(1998, p. 35) add that “the policy world is very crowded and there are already multiple 
instruments in place. This crowding means that any new intervention will have to 
contend with, and be coordinated with, a number of other programs engaged in similar 
and complementary tasks.”  An instrumental theory of public policy provides a way for 
considering these realities in the context of European tobacco control. Finally, this 
approach also represents a response to Rabin and Sugarman’s (2001) observation that 
the limited effectiveness of any single tobacco control strategy leads to a subsequent 
multi-initiative approach to favorably influencing outcomes.  
 Specific hypotheses are derived from propositions (1-6) coming from this chapter 
and are tested empirically in Chapters IV and V. New and existing policy efforts, 
support from the policy environment and supranational factors are linked to policy 
outcomes by way of an instrumental theory of policy effectiveness.  In the next chapter, 
legislative policy histories of fifteen EU member states are explored, categorized and 
analyzed as part of the first step in the empirical investigation of how tobacco policy 
instruments influence policy outcomes.  
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CHAPTER III 
 TOBACCO CONTROL EFFORTS ACROSS MEMBER STATES 
 
 Chapter I demonstrated that cigarette consumption varies greatly across time and 
space. Chapter III explores policy explanations for this phenomenon. I present historical 
information about the types of policy tools used to control tobacco across member states 
of the European Union. The following descriptions of European tobacco policies 
indicate which policy instruments are most commonly utilized, how the list of common 
instruments has expanded over the last thirty years, and how national policy efforts work 
to comply with European directives for controlling tobacco.  
 The chapter is organized in the following manner: First, individual policy 
descriptions are given for each member state, regardless of member status at the time of 
policy activation.  Secondly, the relationship between non-price policy efforts and 
demand for addictive commodities is articulated. Thirdly, tobacco policies are 
categorized into a policy instrument framework and principal component analysis is used 
to empirically investigate whether policies can be separated according to behavioral 
attributes. The results are applied to empirical investigations in Chapter IV and Chapter 
V.  
Member State Policy Instruments 
 Tobacco legislation comes from two main sources: the World Health 
Organization and the European Commissions’ Directorate-General for Health and 
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Consumer Protection. Shafey et al (2003) is an edited tobacco policy reference book and 
part of the global data initiative of the World Health Organization. Other WHO 
publications confirm policy legislation reported in Shafey et al (2003). The main 
contribution of the European Commission is a report by the Aspect Consortium (2004) 
which is part of the Directorate-General for Health and Consumer Protection for the 
European Union.  This publication also reports the implementation of tobacco policies 
across member states and the supranational level of government. 
 
Austria: Tobacco Control 
Austria began controlling tobacco in February 1979. The Federal Ministry of Health 
and Environmental Protection proposed the first piece of tobacco legislation, which 
restricted smoking in hospitals. Health promotion from smoking continued in 1982 with 
requirements for on-pack warnings. While the warnings were not applicable to point of 
sale materials, three health warnings were to be used in rotation:  
“Smoking damages your health” 
“Smoking during pregnancy can damage your child’s health” 
“Protect your children from tobacco smoke” (Shafey et al, 2003, p. 445). 
Also in 1982, the Employees’ Protection Law of 1972 was amended by federal law 
requiring employers to ensure that non-smokers were protected from the effects of 
tobacco smoke in the workplace. More specifically, the law mandated that when 
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smokers and non-smokers worked together in a single room, smoking was forbidden 
unless the non-smokers could be adequately protected by means of proper ventilation. In 
1988, the first privately owned airline, Lauda Air, banned smoking during international 
flights from Austria to East Asia and Australia (Shafey et al, 2003).  
 Product regulation began in 1994. The first law regulating tobacco products 
limited tar content in cigarettes. The official limit was 15 mg of tar per 1 gram of 
tobacco by January 1994, and 12 mg by January 1998, in order to comply with European 
Union standards. The year Austria joined the Union, a comprehensive Tobacco Law was 
enacted. This law established a minimum age to purchase cigarettes, reinforced current 
requirements for health warning labels, and restricted cigarette advertising and sales. 
Along with this, it provided that regulations be adopted in the interest of public health – 
in order to control the consumption and use of harmful ingredients like additives, aroma, 
flavouring, and pesticides in tobacco products (Shafey et al, 2003; Aspect Consortium, 
2004).  
 The Tobacco Law also banned smoking on any premise used for education, 
negotiations, and school sporting activities. Though, smoking was not banned on 
premises used exclusively for private purposes.  Despite this, smoking as restricted in 
many public spaces, including public authority buildings and establishments in which 
children or teenagers were supervised or provided with accommodations. Smoking 
restrictions expanded to include universities and vocational training establishments, as 
well as establishments used for performances or exhibitions. While designated smoking 
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areas could be specified, tobacco smoke was not permitted into areas where the smoking 
ban applied. More specifically, sufficient numbers of non-smoking areas had to be in 
fixed locations in facilities of public and private bus, rail, air, and shipping operations. 
Apart from environmental tobacco smoke (ETS) restrictions, the Tobacco Law banned 
advertising of tobacco products with more than 10mg of tar (to be effective January 
1997) and press advertising was restricted to not more than one advertising page per 
periodical, per manufacturer (Shafey et al, 2003; Aspect Consortium, 2004). 
 The comprehensive Tobacco Law also represented efforts to comply with 
supranational directives. For example, policy was enacted which modified on-pack 
health warnings, to include: “Smoking increases the risk of cancer” and “Smoking 
contributes to heart disease.”    
In 1999, Austrian Airlines banned all smoking on all flights. Also in 1999, 
supporting legislation was passed restricting smoking further in public indoor places. For 
example, smoking was restricted in health facilities, elevators, theatres, cinemas, and 
concert halls (Shafey et al, 2003).  
More advertising restrictions were also enacted in 1999. Television and radio 
advertising of tobacco products was prohibited. Advertising of products in cinemas was 
only allowed after six o’clock in the evening. In addition to advertising restrictions in 
periodicals, newspaper advertisements were restricted to one page per issue and 
specifications were given as to the distance between tobacco-advertisement posters (at 
least 150 meters). Tobacco posters were also no longer permitted in the vicinity of 
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schools. In the same year, legislation banned advertising by any means of public 
transportation, except international trains, ships, and airways (Shafey et al, 2003).  
Product regulation in 1999 consisted of restrictions on the promotion of generic 
cigarettes or brands with tar content in excess of 10 mg per 1 gram of tobacco. 
Additionally, celebrities, athletes, or young people aged thirty and under were no longer 
allowed to be used in tobacco advertising. This restriction was in response to tobacco 
companies eluding to the healthy lifestyle benefits of smoking. Finally, requirements 
were established requiring ingredient disclosure on cigarette packs (Shafey et al, 2003; 
Aspect Consortium, 2004). 
 
Belgium: Tobacco Control 
 Belgium began controlling tobacco in September 1976. The first law prohibited 
smoking in public transportation vehicles, including trams, buses, and underground 
trains.  However, smoking was not banned. Smokers were instead given designated areas 
for consumption. In 1979, legislation was enacted affecting the manufacturing, 
marketing, and promotion of tobacco products. More specifically, restrictions were 
placed on vending machine distribution, health warning labels were introduced, tar 
content was prescribed, ingredients were disclosed on packaging, and advertising and 
sales were restricted (Shafey et al, 2003).  
 In March 1980, free tobacco products (i.e. promotional samples) were prohibited. 
The following September, tar and nicotine content were prescribed and health warnings 
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were required on all tobacco products (similar to Austria, four labels were used on an 
annual rotating basis).  In order to strengthen past legislation, all tobacco packaging, 
advertisements, and point of sale materials had to carry tar and nicotine levels of tobacco 
products (Shafey et al, 2003).  
 Further advertising legislation was passed in January 1982, restricting advertising 
in the form of bills or posters and required further disclosure of tar and nicotine levels by 
manufacturers, for cigarettes. In the same year (December), an official decree was 
enacted promoting health education curricula and information programs concerning 
tobacco and tobacco use.   The same legislation restricted smoking in public places, 
health care facilities, and on public transportation (Shafey et al, 2003).   
 Smoking was also prohibited on premises where school children were present, in 
preschools and establishments providing primary, special, and artistic schooling. Finally, 
in order to strengthen previous September 1980 legislation, disclosure statements were 
required with clear indications of tar and nicotine content on packs of cigarettes, cigars, 
cigarillos, and other tobacco products. An additional decree in December 1982 promoted 
restrictions against advertising directed at children. In March 1987, legislation was 
enacted to reinforce the prohibition of smoking in public places and on premises in 
which children or persons of school age were received, cared for, or provided 
accommodation (Shafey et al, 2003). 
 In December of 1990, Belgium passed its first laws regulating tobacco products. 
By December 1992, maximum tar yields were to be 15 mg  per 1 gram of tobacco and 
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maximum nicotine yields were to be 1.5 mg. By December 1997, amounts were to be 12 
mg and 1.2 mg, respectively, in order to comply with EU directives. Along with this, 
vending machine distribution of tobacco products was forbidden, unless located in a 
tobacco retail shop (Shafey et al, 2003; Aspect Consortium, 2004).   
In support of the official decree in December 1982, a law in April 1990 
prohibited advertising of tobacco products on radio, television, in newspapers, and other 
publications aimed at minors. Advertising was also prohibited using the following 
means: 
 aircraft, boats, or vehicles, except for those taking part in competitions or 
being used to transport tobacco; 
 films, videotapes, slides, other types of visual presentations; 
 the distribution or door-to-door delivery of stickers or promotional 
leaflets; 
 free samples of tobacco products; 
 brand names or symbols of tobacco products, or any other image usually 
associated with everyday objects, other than those which are part of the 
personal equipment of participants in sporting competitions; 
 and illuminated signs, except within the entrance to places where tobacco 
products are available for sale (Shafey et al, 2003). 
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Where advertising is permitted, contents are limited to the name of the product, 
brand name and symbol, representations of products directly associated with smoking, 
tar and nicotine levels, and information on price and quality.   
In May of 1990, additional environmental tobacco smoke (ETS) legislation was 
enacted. Smoking was partially restricted in enclosed places where public services are 
distributed. This includes places where ill or elderly people are admitted or treated, 
healthcare is provided, children or young people are admitted, educational and 
professional training are provided, entertainment is offered, exhibitions are mounted, or 
sports are practiced. Designated smoking areas are allowed and restrictions are not 
applicable to places designed specially for the provision and consumption of food and 
drinks, which do not exceed 50 square meters in area. Clearly defined areas can be set 
aside for smokers, but they must minimize the nuisance of smoke to non-smokers. In 
places where smoking is permitted, a proper ventilation system must be installed, clear 
visible signs are to be used, and signs must be displayed with the wording “Beyond this 
point, it is forbidden to smoke in the whole building” (Shafey et al, 2003, p.447 )   
Following in January of 1992, the executive of the French Community enacted 
an order concerning the dissemination of educational campaigns for health by 
broadcasting agencies. This was followed by a 1993 order obliging employers to adopt a 
policy on smoking at work, to be negotiated with the company’s health and safety 
committee (Shafey et al, 2003).  
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In December of 1997, the Crown Order of December 1982 was repealed. This 
legislation continued to promote restrictions on tobacco products, specifically 
prohibiting advertising at point of sale locations, broadcast media, on billboards, and 
sponsorship of sports and other company events. Also the use of names of services or 
products indirectly related to tobacco products was prohibited. Finally, the launch of 
new products bearing the same name as tobacco products was completely banned 
(Shafey et al, 2003). 
In September 1999, the Belgian Court amended previous advertising bans so as 
to permit tobacco advertising at worldwide events until July 2003. Permission for 
indirect advertising was also reinstated (Shafey et al, 2003). 
 
Denmark: Tobacco Control 
 Denmark did not begin controlling tobacco until 1980. The first law (March 
1980) prohibited smoking on premises where food was being prepared for resale. Then, 
in June of 1987, the Ministry of Culture prohibited advertising of tobacco on television. 
Shortly afterwards, in September 1988, The Ministry of Health banned smoking in all 
Ministry of Health workplaces and in meetings of public councils, boards, and 
commissions unless all participants agreed to permit smoking. Individual ministers were 
directed to introduce non-smoking environments on public premises under their 
jurisdiction. However, smoking on government, state-owned premises (i.e. 
administrative offices and state-owned hospitals, day care centers, residential institutions 
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and educational establishments) was restricted. Along with this, smoking was prohibited 
on public transport with fixed routes (Shafey et al, 2003). 
 In March 1990, the Ministry of Health began regulating labelling of tobacco 
products and tar content. More specifically, all tobacco products were to have the words 
“extremely injurious to health” printed on the package, along with tar and nicotine 
information (Shafey et al, 2003, p. 459). The Council on Preventive Policy and the 
Council on Tobacco-Induced Damage to Health, in May of the same year, passed a law 
establishing 1) committees on tobacco control, 2) information programs, and 3) 
evaluation of smoking control programs (Shafey et al, 2003). 
 In June of 1990, the Ministry of Health was authorized to issue provisions to 
implement the Directives of the European Union Communities on the labelling of 
tobacco products and the tar content of cigarettes and supervise compliance with these 
requirements. These provisions included requiring all packs of tobacco products to carry 
the general warning, “Extremely harmful to health -- National Board of Health” and also 
a specific warning (rotating from previous legislation). Also, tar and nicotine contents 
had to be stated on the pack (Shafey et al, 2003, p. 460).  
The Ministry of Social Affairs enacted an environmental smoking (ETS) order 
protecting public day care centers as well as areas occupied by children, from smoke. 
Orders were also enacted by the Ministry of Labor, establishing smoke-free areas for 
coffee and lunch breaks in the workplace. In December 1992, previous legislation was 
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reinforced concerning labelling of tobacco products, tar content of cigarettes, and sales 
of tobacco products (Shafey et al, 2003).  
Then, in December 1992 a code of practice between the tobacco industry and the 
government was established. The agreement applied to all tobacco products, including 
cigarette paper and tubes. Bans were imposed on all television and radio advertising and 
advertising in food outlets and restaurants. Bans were also imposed on the use of 
models, actresses or actors appearing to be under 30 years of age, celebrities, health 
personnel, and sports personalities. Press advertising was restricted to a single page not 
exceeding 2000mm of a single column. Also, advertisements were prohibited from 
appearing near articles or pictures related to youth or sports. Health warnings had to 
cover ten percent of the total area of the advertisement and all previous restrictions now 
applied to indirect advertising ((Shafey et al, 2003; Aspect Consortium, 2004).  
 In June of 1995, local authorities and every county council were obliged by the 
government to establish regulations on smoke-free environments in public sector 
workplaces, institutions, and means of transport. In order to reinforce this law, the 
Council on Prevention was made responsible for advising national and community 
authorities on measures to be taken to promote health and to prevent diseases and 
accidents. The law also provided for the appointment, by the Minister of the Interior, on 
an independent Council on Tobacco-Induced Damage to Health (Shafey et al, 2003). 
 In March of 1998, smoking was banned in schools, universities, and on all 
domestic flights. Partial restrictions applied to international flights, all intra-Scandinavia 
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and inter-European Union flights (with exception of Spain, Portugal, Greece, Italy, and 
Ireland) although smoking on ‘long haul’ was left to the airlines’ discretion (Shafey et al, 
2003).  
 
Finland: Tobacco Control 
 Finland began controlling tobacco in 1976. The first set of laws included 
substantial measures to restrict smoking. Over eight percent of estimated annual tax 
revenues from tobacco taxes were to be appropriated for tobacco control. Bans on direct 
and indirect advertising were promoted, except for foreign printed publications whose 
main purpose is not adverting tobacco. Bans were also passed concerning sponsorship 
and brand stretching (Shafey et al, 2003).  
 The sale of tobacco products or accessories to minors under 18 years was 
forbidden and signs reading “tobacco may not be sold to persons under the age of 18” 
and “tobacco is addictive and damages health” had to be posted where products were 
sold (Shafey et al, 2003, p. 463).  
Vending machines were only allowed in places licensed to sell alcohol. 
Designated smoking areas had to be provided in government buildings (although 
employees were allowed to smoke in offices with no clients and where other workers 
were not involuntarily exposed to second-hand smoke). Designated smoking areas were 
established at private worksites, healthcare facilities, educational facilities, buses, ferries, 
 52
 
taxis, railroads, places of entertainment, shopping centers/service centers, and 
restaurants. Smoking was also banned in bars and nightclubs (Shafey et al, 2003). 
Tobacco manufacturers were required to disclose ingredients to the Ministry of 
Social Affairs and Health once a year and health messages and nicotine amounts were 
required on all packs. The Council of State was permitted to issue regulations of 
substances harmful to health as well as regulate the maximum permissible amount of 
additives used in tobacco products. Fines and cease-and-desist orders were set as 
penalties for breaking the law (Shafey et al, 2003).   
In the following year, licenses were required for vending machines other than in 
restaurants licensed to sell alcohol. Oral tobacco was prohibited from being 
commercially imported, sold, or otherwise assigned. Nicotine and tar testing methods 
were prescribed and health warning labels on tobacco products were reinforced, except 
for exports and duty free shops (Shafey et al, 2003).  
In February of 1982, the Council of State prescribed the maximum permitted 
level of nicotine in tobacco products as 50 mg in 1 g of dry matter of tobacco product. In 
this law it is also prescribed that maximum permitted levels of harmful substances be 
applied to factory-manufactured cigarettes. Ten years later, the Council also passed a 
law regulating tar content to 15mg in cigarettes. Also in 1992, legislation was enacted 
requiring health labels on all tobacco products as well as full disclosure of nicotine and 
tar levels (Shafey et al, 2003; Aspect Consortium, 2004).   
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In August of 1994, advertising bans were applied to smokeless tobacco. Shortly 
afterwards, in March of 1995, children under the age of 18 were prohibited from buying 
cigarettes, smoking was banned in the workplace and in public places, including night 
clubs, concert halls, theatres, schools, and youth clubs.  Then, in 1999, the sale of 
tobacco products was prohibited over the internet, unless proper taxing was 
implemented. Along with this, the Finnish Tobacco act of 1999 required that restaurants 
gradually increase non-smoking areas. Companies were obliged to set aside specially 
ventilated smoking rooms, as smoking was banned from all offices with more than one 
employee. Smoking was also banned in all public areas, such as stairwells and corridors. 
In the same spirit, smoking was banned on all Finnish airlines (Shafey et al, 2003). 
 
France: Tobacco Control 
 France began controlling tobacco in July of 1976. Initial legislation created a 
legal basis for restricting smoking in public places. It also banned advertising on radio, 
television, in cinemas, and on all billboards except in tobacco shops. Free distribution of 
tobacco and other products bearing tobacco brand logos was forbidden and advertising 
in newspapers and magazines was restricted. More specifically, the amount of space 
devoted annually to tobacco advertising in the media was not to exceed the average 
number of advertising pages published in 1974-1975. Also, advertising was banned in 
publications for children. Sponsorship of sporting events was also banned, except for a 
limited number of events involving motor vehicles. Finally, smoking was prohibited in 
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schools receiving children under 16, in hospitals, and on public transport (Shafey et al, 
2003). 
 In September of 1977, smoking was prohibited in places intended for use by 
groups where the practice may have had "harmful effects upon health." Following this, 
legislation was enacted regulating tobacco products. In January of 1978, a list was 
established containing substances, which must be indicated on cigarette packages and 
the conditions for determining the presence of such substances. In the same year, 
tobacconists' shops were banned from opening in hospitals. Also, smoking was restricted 
on all aircraft, but not banned. More specifically, effective devices were provided to 
prevent the spread of smoke into the non-smoking areas in aircraft (Shafey et al, 2003, p. 
464).  
 In November of 1978, the Law of August 1905 concerning fraudulent practices 
and misbranding was applied with regard to products and services related to tobacco, 
tobacco products, and tobacco substitutes. A few months later, legislation was also 
enacted restricting the space allowed to advertise tobacco in printed press (Shafey et al, 
2003).  
 In June of 1979, the government produced a list of additives permitted in the 
manufacture of tobacco and tobacco products and their substitutes.  Then, in 1984, a 
specific list was passed into law specifying additives (flavouring agents, texture agents, 
preservatives, and coloring matter), their permitted levels, and their purity criteria. Three 
years later, in 1987, smoking was prohibited in health and educational establishments, 
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food production facilities, premises for young people under 16 years of age, and some 
workplaces. The sale of tobacco was prohibited in all health establishments (Shafey et al, 
2003). 
 In January of 1988, information programs were established in order to emphasize 
the need to observe provisions of the law attempting to reduce the consumption of 
tobacco products in hospitals, in particular. It also stated the specific role of the medical 
profession in educating patients on the issue. One year later, vending machines were 
banned from being located outside tobacco shops (Shafey et al, 2003).  
 In 1991, several measures were enacted to combat tobacco use in France. Free 
samples were prohibited, smoking was banned in palaces intended for collective and 
scholastic use, in collective means of transport, and work places (except in areas 
specifically reserved for smokers). Staff of public and private educational institutions 
were to be provided with information by the school physician concerning tobacco use. 
All cigarettes had to conform to the content restrictions by the end of 1992, with 
infractions punishable by fines and brand suspension (Shafey et al, 2003). 
 Written space for tobacco advertising in newspapers and magazines had to be 
reduced by 66%, by 1992, from the average space for such publicity during 1974-1975. 
Maximum tar limits and labelling requirements set by the European Union were to be 
met. Any advertising, whether direct of indirect, for tobacco or tobacco products, as well 
as any form of free distribution, was prohibited. Also, any form of sponsorship was 
prohibited if its objective was direct or indirect advertising for tobacco or tobacco 
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products. All point of sale advertising was required to be accompanied by a health 
message and the government established the date of an annual event entitled "No 
Tobacco Day"  This legislation also prohibited using the price of tobacco in calculating 
consumer price indexes (Shafey et al, 2003, p. 465; Aspect Consortium, 2004).  
 In April of 1991, the maximum tar content of cigarettes was implemented by 
European Union directive and health warnings were required to accompany any 
promotion or advertising for tobacco products. In the same year, methods were 
determined for analysing nicotine and tar content and for verifying the accuracy of the 
legends to be displayed on packs. In addition to this, systems were established for 
printing health warnings and compulsory legends on tobacco packaging of all tobacco 
products (Shafey et al, 2003). 
 In May of 1992, smoking was prohibited in all public places, including 
businesses, restaurants, schools, workplaces, and public transport, with areas reserved 
for smokers. Smoking was totally prohibited in theatres, exhibition halls, sports arenas, 
places where food was prepared or presented for sale, elevators, taxis, aircraft on all 
domestic flights of less than two hours operated by national carriers, and dining cars of 
trains.  Then, in November of 1992, the Evin Law was passed, which banned the direct 
and indirect advertising of tobacco products, required posters to carry standard health 
warnings, banned smoking of tobacco in all public places (including restaurants, offices, 
educational institutions and leisure centers, except in designated areas), buses and Metro 
stations in Paris and Lyon. The proportion of smoking areas in trains was reduced to 
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thirty percent -- with smoking banned in restaurant and buffet cars. Individuals who 
broke bans risked fines (Shafey et al, 2003). 
 In March of 1993, smoking was banned in prisons. One year later, additional 
sales restrictions were extended to smokeless tobacco. In September of 1995, maximum 
additive levels were set and an advisory group on additives in tobacco products was 
established. Also, smoking was banned on transatlantic flights and flights within the 
European Union on Air France. Finally, in 1992, cigarette tar and nicotine levels were 
specifically set to meet European Union standards -- 12 mg of tar and 1.2 mg by 
December 1997  (Shafey et al, 2003). 
 
Germany: Tobacco Control 
 Germany began controlling tobacco in July 1957. Minors under 16 years of age 
were not permitted to smoke in public. Then, in 1972, partial restrictions were enacted 
on advertising in printed newspapers, magazines, billboards, points of sale, kiosks, and 
cinemas. Advertising was also banned on television and radio. Press, outdoor posters, 
point of sale promotions, sponsorships, and samples were allowed but subjected to 
restrictions. In the same year, advertisements were banned that created the impression 
that consumption of tobacco products was 1) harmless to health, 2) likely to have 
favorable effects on bodily functions and physical performance, 3) likely to induce 
juvenile or adolescents to smoke, 4) make it appear that inhaling of tobacco smoke is 
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something to be imitated, or 5) suggests that tobacco products are natural or pure  
(Shafey et al, 2003). 
 In December of 1975, a list of permitted and prohibited ingredients was updated. 
Then, in October of 1991, tobacco products were required to have labels on the 
maximum tar content in cigarette smoke. Health warnings, however, were not required 
until 1995. In March of 1996, oral smokeless tobacco was banned. Following this, the 
High Court enacted a decision, which allowed German companies to ban smoking 
completely if most employees agreed with the measure. In this case, however, 
companies had to provide acceptable smoking facilities outside the building. Also in 
1996, smoking was banned on all domestic flights and on all flights of Lufthansa 
airlines.  In the same year, cigarette tar and nicotine levels were set to meet European 
Union standards of not more than 15 mg of tar and 1.5 mg of nicotine by December 
1997 (Shafey et al, 2003).  
 
Greece: Tobacco Control 
 Greece began controlling tobacco in 1952. The first law prohibited smoking on 
trains and buses. In April of 1979, smoking was also prohibited in hospital 
establishments and private nursing homes. A smoking room, reserved for hospital 
personnel and visitors, was required on every floor of establishments that had an area of 
200 square meters or more. In April of 1980, smoking was prohibited in all enclosed 
public places belonging to state agencies, public or private companies and organizations, 
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and in other establishments, including post offices, electricity board facilities, hospitals 
and private clinics, and cinemas and theatres (Shafey et al, 2003). 
 In 1987, advertising of tobacco products was banned from radio and television. 
One year later, the Minister of Health, Welfare, and Social Security was given power to 
regulate the advertising of tobacco products.  In December of 1988, health warnings 
became mandatory on cigarette packs and cigarette advertisements. In February 1989, 
tobacco advertising was prohibited in cinemas (except in films not suited for minors), in 
public and private educational institutions, in youth centers, and in sports centers. 
Advertisements were also required to carry the warning "The Ministry of Health issues 
the following warning: SMOKING SERIOUSLY DAMAGES HEALTH"  (Shafey et al, 
2003, p. 467). 
 In March of 1990, smoking was banned on all domestic flights. In the same year, 
the European Union directive on tar yields was implemented. In the following year, the 
sale of oral moist snuff was banned and smoking was further restricted in buses, planes, 
trains, hospitals, and public offices. More specifically, a complete ban was instituted on 
smoking in health care facilities, school buildings, government offices, public 
transportation, and domestic air transport. Partial restrictions were passed on 
international flights  (Shafey et al, 2003).  
Finally, in 1999, Greece was granted a time extension to meet the tar and 
nicotine standards set by the European Union. They were required to come into 
compliance with 15 mg of tar and 1.5 mg of nicotine by December 2000, and 12 mg of 
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tar and 1.2 mg of nicotine by December 2008  (Shafey et al, 2003; Aspect Consortium, 
2004).  
 
Italy: Tobacco Control 
 Italy began controlling tobacco in 1962. The first law prohibited all advertising 
of tobacco products, irrespective of the medium employed. Bans included point of sale, 
sampling, sponsorship, television, radio, cinema, press, and outdoor advertising. Limited 
trade advertising was permitted by the Federazione Italiana Tabaccai (FIT) (Shafey et al, 
2003).  
 In November 1975, smoking was banned in hospitals, school classrooms, closed 
premises used for public meetings, cinemas and theatres, dance halls, betting shops, 
academic lecture halls, libraries, reading rooms open to the public, and private and 
public art galleries. Fines were set for owners or managers of the premises not respecting 
the law. Smoking was also severely restricted on public transport with a ban on smoking 
in buses. In May 1976, an exception was made to the smoking ban for premises in which 
an air conditioner or ventilation system, meeting prescribed conditions, was installed  
(Shafey et al, 2003).  
 In February 1983, fines were raised for breaking advertising prohibitions laid 
down in April 1962. Six years later, health warnings were required to be displayed on 
tobacco products and the promotion of products or services named after tobacco goods 
was also banned. In July 1990, Italy implemented the European Union directive on 
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maximum tar yields. One year later, the government also implemented the European 
Union directive on labelling -- health warnings and ingredient disclosure. Also in 1991, 
direct and indirect advertising of tobacco products on television was prohibited  (Shafey 
et al, 2003).  
 In December 1995, smoking was prohibited in all premises used, for whatever 
purpose, by the public administration and public bodies in carrying out their institutional 
functions, as well as by persons in the private sector providing public services. Premises 
subject to such prohibition were to display a notice to this effect, indicating the 
regulation in question, the sanctions incurred, and the authorities empowered to assure 
compliance with the prohibition and record infringements (Shafey et al, 2003). 
 In the same year, it was made illegal to sell or give tobacco products to children 
under the age of sixteen. Along with this, smoking was prohibited on all domestic 
flights, as well as eighty percent of flights between the U.S. and the European Union on 
Aitalia airlines (Shafey et al, 2003).  
Finally, in 1995, cigarette vending machines were only allowed to be installed in 
the immediate surroundings of the relevant retailer. They could not be installed in 
buildings linked to the supervision of the arts and all advertising on cigarette vending 
machines was prohibited (Shafey et al, 2003).  
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The Netherlands: Tobacco Control  
 Tobacco control began in the Netherlands in 1981. The first law established that 
smoking was a threat to health. More specifically, the words “Minister of Health and 
Environmental Protection” and nicotine and tar contents were required to appear on 
cigarette packs. In December 1986, tar and nicotine contents were required to be shown 
on cigarette packaging with official health warnings on both the front and backs of 
packs. A system of four rotational health warnings was put into operation and tar and 
nicotine levels were required to be determined in accordance with a method designated 
by the ministers of a) Welfare, Health, and Culture Affairs, b) Agriculture and Fisheries 
Agency, and c) Department of Economic Affairs (Shafey et al, 2003).  
 Shortly afterward, the Tobacco Law of 1988 was enacted requiring ingredient 
disclosure by manufactures and prohibiting the sale and use of tobacco products in 
health care facilities, social welfare offices, sports arenas, and socio-cultural and 
educational establishments administered by the State. Furthermore, advertising of 
tobacco products was forbidden on radio and television. Finally, oral tobacco was 
prohibited (Shafey et al, 2003). 
 In December 1989, smoking was banned in some areas of buildings belonging to 
or run by the state, including all places to which the public had access and all communal 
areas (except offices), specifically rooms containing counters, waiting rooms, halls, 
corridors, stairways, elevators, meeting rooms, classrooms, toilets, canteens, and rest and 
leisure rooms. However, smoking bans could be suspended in waiting rooms, canteens 
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and leisure rooms where permission may be given to smoke either on a third of the 
surface area or for a period limited to one-third of operating hours, if this does not bother 
non-smokers (Shafey et al, 2003). 
 In 1992, restrictions were enacted on smoking in workplaces, public places, 
schools, health care facilities, and government buildings. Penalties were also set for 
breaking the decree. In August 1998, all smoking was banned on all flights of KLM 
Royal Dutch Airlines and the sale of tobacco products to individuals under 18 years of 
age was prohibited (Shafey et al, 2003).   
 One year later a code was established between the tobacco industry and 
publishers. Advertising was not to be aimed at young people or non-smokers. A 
relationship between health, sports, youth, and tobacco was not allowed to be suggested 
in advertisements. No advertising was allowed in testimonials, billboards, aircraft, trains, 
buses, or hospitals. No collective campaigns for tobacco products were allowed and 
health warnings were required to be in all advertisements. Portraying people below 30 
years of age or advertising in media with more than 25% young readers was prohibited 
(Shafey et al, 2003).  
Finally, no advertising was allowed in nightclubs, at festivals or in movie 
theaters. Free samples were prohibited to people below 18 years of age and no sports 
sponsorship (except motor and car racing) was allowed. Direct mail or un-addressed 
mail actions (without prior consent) were prohibited (Shafey et al, 2003). 
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Portugal: Tobacco Control 
 Tobacco control began in Portugal in 1978. Smoking was prohibited in urban 
public transport as well as in inter-urban public transport on journeys lasting up to one 
hour. In September 1980, general principles for smoking control were set out, including 
an adverting prohibition, smoking prohibition, requirements for health warnings and 
ingredient disclosure, maximum nicotine and tar contents, and penalties. As of 1984, all 
tobacco advertising, with the exception of limited point of sale activities, was prohibited 
(Shafey et al, 2003).  
 In May 1983, evaluation standards were established for smoking control 
programs and smoking was prohibited on the premises of health care facilities, in 
teaching establishments, and on premises intended for persons aged less than 16 years of 
age. Also, advertising for tobacco in national media outlets was prohibited. Health 
warnings were required for all cigarettes intended for inland consumption with an 
indication of the nicotine and tar content on the pack (Shafey et al, 2003). 
 In the same year, tobacco advertising on television, radio, in newspapers, 
magazines, coupons, cinemas, billboards, and at points of sale was prohibited. Health 
warnings were also required for remaining advertising. Smoking was prohibited in all 
places where health care was dispensed, all premises used by minors under 16 years of 
age, educational establishments, enclosed sports facilities, theaters and other enclosed 
premises for entertainment and leisure activities, and public waiting rooms and elevators 
(Shafey et al, 2003). 
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 Specific smoking areas could be provided on the condition they were not used 
by sick people, minors, women who were pregnant or breast feeding, or participants in 
sporting events. In addition to this, smoking was banned in libraries, restaurants (at 
owner's initiative) and workplaces (at non-smokers' initiative if there are areas where 
smoking can be permitted). Smoking was also banned in the Parliament assembly halls 
and meeting rooms. Finally, fines were established for individuals and organizations 
breaking these laws (Shafey et al, 2003).   
In 1991, Portugal implemented the European Union directive on maximum tar 
content and labeling. In the same year, a decree was enacted which allowed tobacco 
sponsorship of motor sports vehicles competing in organized events which were part of 
the European Union or World championship. In addition to this, committees on tobacco 
control were established and bans were instituted against the sale and consumption of 
oral smokeless tobacco (Shafey et al, 2003; World Health Organization, 1997).   
In 1996, free tobacco samples were forbidden, vending machine distribution was 
banned, and smoking was banned on all flights of TAP Air Portugal airlines. Finally, in 
the same year, the minimum age for purchase and consumption of tobacco was 
established as 18 (Shafey et al, 2003). 
 
Spain: Tobacco Control 
 Tobacco control began in Spain in 1978. The first Crown Decree focused 
attention on regulating advertising for tobacco and alcoholic beverages by state 
 66
 
broadcasting media. In April 1979, the expression 'low nicotine' was allowed to be used 
in connection with the marketing and advertising of cigarettes; only if nicotine yields of 
one cigarette were less than 1 mg. The expression 'low tar' could only be used if tar 
yields of one cigarette were less than 16 mg of tar. Under this decree, samples of all 
cigarette products were to be submitted to government authorities for standards testing. 
Furthermore, in May 1980, low tar and low nicotine cigarettes were only allowed to be 
advertised as such when authorized by the government (Shafey et al, 2003).  
In 1982, smoking was banned in health care facilities and on public 
transportation. Information advertising of new tobacco products with low tar and 
nicotine contents were permitted for two years following their introduction to the 
market. All advertising of tobacco products was banned through public information 
channels (television and radio). Health warnings were required on all packs of tobacco 
for sale on the domestic market and sales of tobacco to those under 16 years of age was 
forbidden. New tobacco products with more then 24 mg of tar and 1.8 mg of nicotine 
were banned from introduction into the market (Shafey et al, 2003).  
In July 1984, the rights of non-smokers were formally recognized under Spanish 
law, which stated that the right to health of the non-smoker always precedes the right of 
smokers to smoke. In the same decree, smoking was banned (except in designated areas) 
in welfare establishments for children under 16, health centers, educational 
establishments, public administration premises to which the public has direct access, 
premises where food is prepared, exhibition halls, reading rooms, enclosed commercial 
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premises, theaters, cinemas, sporting halls, elevators, urban and long distance vehicles 
and means of collective transportation admitting standing passengers, school buses, 
medical transportation, domestic flights less than 90 minutes, and workplaces with 
industrial contaminants or pregnant women (Shafey et al, 2003). 
In March 1988, rotating health warnings and the display of tar and nicotine 
contents on cigarette packs was required. The maximum tar yield for one cigarette was 
established at 15 mg and the maximum nicotine yield was 1.3 mg. Cigarettes classified 
as low nicotine, low tar, as well as those with light or mild designations were required to 
meet specific standards. Smoking was not permitted in welfare centers for youth, health 
centers, teaching centers, halls for use by the general public, all urban and long-distance 
vehicles for collective transport, school vehicles, rail and sea transport, and in any place 
where a greater risk to the health of workers exists through the combination of the harm 
caused by tobacco and industrial contamination (Shafey et al, 2003).   
Posters reminding the public of the ban on sales to children were required to be 
placed in tobacco shops. The sale of tobacco products was forbidden in health 
establishments, educational establishments, and those intended for care of children. 
Products were allowed to be sold from automatic vending machines only on enclosed 
preemies and machines were required to display health warnings (Shafey et al, 2003). 
In June 1988, signs and warnings to designate non-smoking areas were required 
to be visible and intelligible in design and format. Nicotine and tar contents were 
required to be stated on packs of cigarettes marketed in Spain.  In the same year, tobacco 
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advertising on television was restricted to the hours of 2200 and 0800. Press and 
billboard advertising was limited and free distribution of cigarettes was prohibited 
(Shafey et al, 2003). 
Similarly, in 1995, tobacco manufacturers agreed not to advertise in theaters or 
on billboards, as well as bus shelters that were situated less than 200 meters away from 
schools or colleges (Shafey et al, 2003). 
Finally, in 1998, all advertising of tobacco products was banned from television, 
video, audio tapes sold or rented to the public, publications whose purpose is primarily 
addressed to minors under the age of 18, cinemas showing films intended expressly for 
and attended mainly by young people aged under 18 years of age, posters, billboards, 
and other large public display media located within less than 200 meters from the 
entrances to schools and other educational centers  (Shafey et al, 2003; World Health 
Organization, 1997).  
Product promotion and promotional articles were not allowed to be addressed 
persons under the age of 18 and printed communication matter regarding tobacco 
products was required to display health warnings, as well as nicotine and tar content. 
Finally, Iberia and Spanair ban smoking on all North Atlantic, Intra-European Union and 
Intra-Spain flights. The only flights where smoking would be allowed were between 
Spain and Buenos Aires, Rio de Janeiro, and Sao Paulo and between Spain and Cuba. 
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Sweden: Tobacco Control 
 Tobacco control began in Sweden in 1975. The first set of laws focused on 
warnings and declarations of harmful content to be displayed on tobacco products. In 
May 1976, the National Board of Health and Welfare required all tobacco products to 
display health warnings and ingredients. Following in 1978, The National Board of 
Consumer Policies prohibited advertising of tobacco products in the sports pages of 
daily newspapers, in sports newspapers, and in publications aimed at people under 20 
years of age. At this time, distribution of free samples was prohibited (Shafey et al, 
2003).  
 Then, in 1982, the National Board of Health and Welfare amended the 1976 
policy by requiring the levels of harmful substances in cigarette smoke and the year to 
which they are applicable, on cigarette packs. Also the permitted discrepancy between 
declared levels and actual levels found in products was raised to fifteen percent (Shafey 
et al, 2003).  
 One year later, smoking was restricted in the workplace and other public places. 
In 1986, smoking was banned on all domestic flights of Linjeflyg airlines. In 1988, a 
general law was passed stating that no one should, against his will, be subjected to 
discomfort or to health hazards caused by tobacco smoke in public places and 
workplaces. In 1993, the sale and advertising of tobacco products was restricted.  In the 
following year, smoking was banned in schools, health care facilities, and on public 
transportation. Bans were also instituted on advertising of tobacco products (except in 
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tobacco shops). More specifically, only trade magazines were allowed to carry tobacco 
advertisements and even they were restricted in content (Shafey et al, 2003).  
Within this legislation, employers were given the responsibility for ensuring that 
employees are not exposed to smoke at work. Similarly, restaurants seating more than 50 
people were required to have a non-smoking area. Then, in 1994, the Tobacco Law was 
passed. This law prescribed maximum levels for harmful substances that a tobacco 
product contains. Cigarette packs were required to show one of 16 messages issued by 
the National Board of Health and Welfare. Packs were to display a declaration of 
content, as well as the corresponding average for all brands sold in Sweden (Shafey et al, 
2003).  
In addition, smoking was prohibited on premises intended for activities for 
children and young people, for medical and health care, for joint use in residential 
accommodation and special service or care, on domestic public transport or in areas 
intended for use by passengers, in premises where a public meeting or event is being 
held and in other premises if the general public has access. Non-smoking rooms were 
required to be provided in hotels, transport, and restaurants with more than 50 seats. All 
radio and television advertising was banned and other forms of advertising were to be 
used in moderation. Tobacco manufacturers were not allowed to actively seek new areas 
of trade or encourage tobacco use (Shafey et al, 2003). 
Finally, beginning in 1998, the maximum permitted tar level was lowered to 12 
mg per cigarette to comply with European Union standards and maximum nicotine 
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content was lowered to 1.3 mg per cigarette, as specified in 1993 (Shafey et al, 2003; 
Aspect Consortium, 2004). 
 
United Kingdom: Tobacco Control 
 Tobacco control began in the UK in 1964. The first set of laws focused on 
banning advertising for cigarettes and roll-your-own tobacco on television and radio 
outlets. Then in 1978 and 1979, legislation was enacted to regulate financial matters 
concerning tobacco revenue and establish standards for higher tar cigarettes, 
respectively. In 1986, the sale of oral tobacco was prohibited and it was made an offense 
to sell tobacco products to persons under the age of 16, including vending machine sales. 
As such, owners of vending machines were required to prevent the machine from being 
used by those under 16 years of age (Shafey et al, 2003). 
 In 1986, a voluntary agreement on advertising, promotion and health warnings 
was passed. This agreement ended cinema advertising, limited poster advertising to half 
of the level of the previous year, prevented posters from being positioned close to 
schools, and prohibited advertising in magazines where one third or more of reader are 
young women.  Also, an independently chaired Committee for Monitoring Agreements 
on Tobacco Advertising and Sponsorship (COMITAS) was established. Finally, this 
agreement provided for the addition of six rotating health warning on all packs and 
advertisements (Shafey et al, 2003).  
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 In 1988, smoking was banned on all domestic flights and the sale of oral snuff 
was prohibited. In 1991, the Children and Young Persons Protection from Tobacco Act 
increased penalties for selling to minors.  Additionally, local authorities where cited with 
the responsibility for implementing the law. This set of laws also required retailers and 
vending machine operators to display warning notices stating that “it is illegal to sell 
tobacco products to anyone under the age of 16” (Shafey et al, 2003, p.503). 
Similarly, in 1992, the government required that health warnings be displayed on 
tobacco products and that advertising be restricted further. These restrictions were 
purposely designed to be more strict than those mandated by the European Union. For 
example, limits were placed on advertising on videos for private use as well as with 
magazines with 25% young female readership. The number of external advertising signs 
was required to be reduced by 50%, phased over five years (Shafey et al, 2003).  
In the same year, the government enacted product regulations -- setting the 
maximum tar limit in a cigarette at 15 mg. Along with this, the Consumer Protection Act 
of 1992 required specifically that tobacco products be labeled clearly with health 
warnings and ingredient disclosures on the pack (Shafey et al, 2003; Aspect Consortium, 
2004).  
In June 1995, shop-front advertising of tobacco products was prohibited, along 
with advertising on posters under 48”sheet size (mobile size). In addition, limits were 
placed on expenditures on poster advertisements and government health warnings were 
required to appear on all such advertisements. Tobacco advertising was also banned on 
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computer games and in any place within a 200 meter radius of school entrances (Shafey 
et al, 2003). 
In 1999, smoking was banned on all flights of British Airways, British Midland 
airlines, and Virgin Atlantic airlines. In the same year, smoking was restricted in 
workplaces, public places, schools, health care facilities, public transportation, and in 
government buildings (Shafey et al, 2003).   
 
Framework for European Tobacco Control Policy Explanations 
 Country-level policy descriptions make clear the wide variation of instruments 
used to control tobacco, especially cigarette consumption. These non-price policies come 
in addition to fiscal policies designed to make cigarette consumption more expensive by 
raising cost through different taxation strategies.  In order to link policies to specific 
outcomes, it is beneficial to consider the causal theory about how general policy goals 
are obtained (Meier and Licari 1998). Policies controlling tobacco are aimed at 
manipulating either the supply or demand of tobacco products available to consumers. 
Manipulating demand for tobacco via government intervention is difficult, however, 
given the addictive nature of tobacco products, especially cigarettes. The ability of target 
populations (e.g., manufactured-cigarette smokers) to respond to these regulatory efforts 
is constrained by relative levels of addiction to the commodity.  This phenomenon in the 
tobacco politics literature is well documented. For example, Licari (1997, 2000) and 
Meier and Licari (1998) develop a formal model of cigarette consumption which 
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accounts for three levels of possible addiction, or demand elasticities. Addicts 
theoretically have inelastic demand for cigarettes. Increasing the price of cigarettes does 
not compel addicts to decrease demand. Conversely, quitters have highly elastic demand 
curves which are sensitive to most efforts aimed at deterring consumption. In this 
situation, price increases of any size provide compelling reason to quit smoking. 
Between addicts and quitters are those with normal demand elasticities. Their demand 
curves are theoretically only slightly more inelastic than quitters (i.e., closer to the 
demand elasticity associated with a non-addictive commodity or good).  Aggregate 
consumer demand represents all three types of consumers: addicts, quitters, and those in 
between.  
 Traditional price policies may thin aggregate demand by altering the target 
population to include those less likely to quit.  Non-price tobacco control policies are 
also aimed at shifting aggregate demand towards less consumption, by conveying further 
costs, or disincentives. Table 1 summarizes the main non-price policy instruments, 
drawn from above tobacco legislation descriptives. Specific examples of implementation 
strategies associated with each instrument are also reported.  
 The first step in making use of the instrumental approach is to group policy 
instruments according to dominant underlying attributes. For example, while warning 
labels and educational campaigns represent different avenues to tobacco control, as 
policy instruments they share attributes of providing consumers with information, 
allowing them to decide for themselves whether and how much risk is acceptable 
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TABLE  1 Summary of European Policy Instruments to Control Tobacco,   
  1970- 2000  
 
Policy Instrument    Implementation Examples 
 
Advertising      Partial restrictions or bans on cigarette 
      ads across newspapers, magazines, radio 
      billboards, points-of-sale, and television.  
 
      Regulation of advertising content and 
      sponsorship.   
    
      Limitations on advertising where minors 
      are present, including schools and movie 
      theaters. 
 
     Ban on free samples of tobacco. 
 
Sales      Minors6 banned from purchasing tobacco in 
      shops or vending machines. 
   
     Tobacco sales not permitted in proximity to 
      schools, premises where minors are likely 
      present, or healthcare facilities. 
 
     Ban on selling tobacco products through 
      vending machines. 
 
Environmental Tobacco Smoke  Restriction on smoking in public spaces, in  
(ETS)      proximity to childcare facilities, hospitals, 
      outdoor arenas, and international  and 
      domestic flights.  
 
      Workplace protection of non-smokers. 
      Designated smoking rooms required. 
 
      Establish standards for dual-ventilation 
      systems. 
 
 
                                                 
6 Most member states designate those under 18 as ‘minors’, concerning the purchase of tobacco products 
(exceptions include Spain and Italy where a minor is designated under 16).  
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TABLE  1 Continued.  
 
Policy Instrument    Implementation Examples 
 
Ingredients     Establish list of permitted and prohibited 
      ingredients allowed in tobacco products. 
 
      Standards established for ingredients of 
      cigarettes classified as low nicotine and tar, 
      light, or mild. 
 
Health Warnings    Warning labels required on cigarette packs, 
      tobacco advertisements, and points-of-sale. 
 
      Strong warning labels required linking 
      smoking to death and disease, sanctioned 
      by government health official. 
 
      Rotation requirement for warnings on 
      cigarette packs. 
 
Capacity-Building    Grants of authority to agencies or councils 
      to monitor industry compliance to  
      government regulations. 
 
      Establishing protocol for monitoring  
      established ingredient standards. 
 
Educational Campaigns   Development of public information  
      programs regarding tobacco use. 
   
      Adoption of health education curriculum 
      which includes dangers of smoking  
      initiation and benefits of smoking cessation. 
 
      Information on tobacco use made available 
      to staff of public educational institutions by 
      school physicians. 
 
      Establish national advisory board for 
      deciding and disseminating information on 
      tobacco consumption.  
Source: Shafey et al, 2003 
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 (information). The remaining instruments  (sales, ETS, ingredients, capacity-building, 
advertising) share attributes of setting standards for what is permitted, and for building  
control mechanisms to ensure compliance (command – control) in the regulation of 
tobacco.7  
 The second step is to determine empirically whether these policy instruments 
converge on common underlying notions.  
 
 
TABLE 2 Principal Component Factor Analysis of Tobacco Control Policy in 
  European Union Countries: 1970-2000.8
 
Policy             Factor Loadings Policy                     Factor Loadings 
  
Command-Control:     Information:
 Advertising   .788  Health Warnings           .755 
 Sales    .839  Educational Campaigns       .755 
 ETS    .804 
 Ingredients   .875 
 Capacity-Building  .914 
 
Retained Factors             1  Retained Factors                 1 
Eigenvalue, Factor 1             3.57  Eigenvalue, Factor 1         1.13 
N           420  N       420 
Cronbach’s α    .886  Cronbach’s α            .272 
Principal-component analysis conducted with STATA 9.0. 
 
                                                 
7 Additional discussion of command-control and informational policy instruments is offered in Chapter IV. 
8 Fourteen EU countries are included in all factor analyses reported in this chapter: Austria, Belgium, 
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Netherlands and the 
United Kingdom. Luxembourg is not included due to data limitations. 
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Principal component analysis is appropriate for this purpose. I explore two strategies. 
First, I apply principal component analysis based on the theoretical distinction between 
command-control and information policies coming from the regulatory policy literature.  
Command-control policies, for example, are correlated. A factor analysis (Table 2) of 
instruments aimed at restricting tobacco advertising, sales, environmental tobacco 
smoke, cigarette ingredients, and provisions for capacity-building and accountability 
indicates that a single factor accounts for over 70 percent of variation with each factor 
loading at .78 or higher.  
 Similarly, a factor analysis of information policies which provide health 
warnings and authorize educational campaigns indicates that a single factor accounts for 
over 56 percent of variation with each factor loading .75 or higher. The scale reliability 
coefficient among  information instruments, however, calls into question whether this is 
the most appropriate way to categorize these policies.  
 The second strategy assumes no theoretical distinction among policies in the area 
of tobacco control in Europe. I am interested in whether the collective behavioral 
attributes of non-price policies represent another succinct way to determine how policies 
and outcomes are connected. Instead of running two separate factor analyses, I perform 
one factor analysis of all policies using two rotations: unrotated factors and oblique-
rotated factors. Table 3 reports findings from the unrotated analysis. Of the four factors 
retained, a single factor accounts for 88 percent of variation with each factor loading at 
.75 or higher. This provides one possible measure of policy scope that may be useful in 
further empirical analysis.  
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TABLE 3 Unrotated Factor Analysis of Tobacco Control Policy in European 
  Union  Countries: 1970-2000. 
 
Policy                   Factor Loadings  
  
Advertising     .778   
Sales      .750   
ETS      .766 
Ingredients     .841 
Capacity-Building    .915 
Health Warnings    .804 
Educational Campaigns   .630 
 
Retained Factors                   4   
Eigenvalue, Factor 1                        4.27   
N                420  
Cronbach’s α                .893  
Principal-component analysis conducted with STATA 9.0.  
 
 
 
Table 4 reports findings from the oblique analysis. Oblique rotation is an improved 
method of analysis over un-rotation in this context because oblique rotation assumes 
items included in the analysis are correlated.9 A single factor accounts for over 65 
percent of the variation with each factor loading .63 or higher. Factor scores from Table 
4 are used as a measure of policy scope in Chapter IV and Chapter V. I choose these 
over  
                                                 
9 Correlation is assumed in the case of European tobacco control because many of these policy 
interventions are adopted simultaneously across countries and they cannot be thoroughly disentangled with 
available data. Despite not having ideal data, I am able to continue advancing a test of an instrumental 
theory of public policy by considering a measure of policy scope. I will compare this measure to those 
developed in Table 2 in Chapter III.  
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TABLE 4 Principal Component  Factor Analysis with Oblique Rotation:  
  Tobacco Control Policy in European Union Countries: 1970-2000. 
 
Policy                   Factor Loadings  
  
Advertising     .813   
Sales      .774   
ETS      .803 
Ingredients     .852 
Capacity-Building    .919 
Health Warnings    .828 
Educational Campaigns   .630 
 
Retained Factors                   1   
Eigenvalue, Factor 1                        4.56   
N                420  
Cronbach’s α     .893  
Principal-component analysis conducted with STATA 9.0.  
 
 
Table 3 based on the assumption of correlation advanced by oblique rotation within 
principal component analysis (Nunally and Berstein, 1994).  
 In conclusion, there are seven main non-price policy instruments which have the 
purpose of influencing cigarette demand: restrictions on environmental tobacco smoke, 
sales, advertising and promotion, product health warnings, product control through 
ingredients, capacity building for regulatory compliance, and educational campaigns on 
dangers of tobacco consumption. These policy instruments can be analyzed two ways: 
First, they can be presented as theoretically distinct according to whether they converge 
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on common notions of information and command-control. While this is the preferred 
strategy for testing the theory presented in Chapter II, modifications may have to 
accommodate the realities of policy adoption in this context and data limitations. 
Secondly, data reduction strategies can be used to account for simultaneous adoption and 
correlation, which produce a measure for overall policy scope.  I test an instrumental 
theory of public policy using and comparing both strategies in the next two chapters as I 
explore further the effectiveness of policy instruments in curbing consumption. 
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CHAPTER IV 
TOBACCO CONTROL AND HEALTH GOVERNANCE 
 
 Chapter III illustrates which tobacco control instruments are employed across 
Europe at the member state level using historical analysis. Additionally, Chapter III 
organizes tobacco control efforts into policy instrument categories and discusses how 
they are related to policy outcomes by way of economic theories of supply and demand, 
given various demand elasticities. Chapter IV incorporates information from previous 
chapters to conduct an empirical analysis of determinants of tobacco consumption across 
the European Union from 1970-2000. This chapter, along with Chapter V gives a more 
complete picture of tobacco policy effectiveness by exploring individual and multiple 
interventions, along with overall policy scope and supranational considerations for 
policy performance. 
 First I discuss how tobacco policy interventions can be understood as 
mechanisms of governance to improve European public health. Secondly, I introduce a 
model of policy effectiveness which considers the independent influence of price and 
non-price policy instruments, as well as their combined influence on consumption. I 
develop policy measures consistent with the instrumental view presented in Chapter I, 
while also taking into account the influence of the policy environment. Finally, I present 
findings and implications for European tobacco control specifically, and the study of 
comparative public policy, generally. 
 83
 
Tobacco Policy Interventions as Mechanisms of Governance  
Assessing how public policies govern public health begins with the argument that 
policy instruments are governance mechanisms. Policy is one expression of the 
relationship between states and societies in a modern system of governance. For 
example, policies may reflect how governments respond to balancing rights of 
individuals with broader notions of public protection when the greater public health is at 
risk.  
The response of health outcomes to various public policies depends in part on 
which instruments are used and how amenable the policy environment is to creating a 
context of support. In this section, I establish how a logic of governance is useful for 
evaluating and comparing policy outcomes. These ideas shape the empirical model of 
policy effectiveness of tobacco control in the multilevel environment of the European 
Union. 
The first portion of the chapter introduces the concept of governance and how it 
applies to multilevel settings of policymaking. Secondly, I link policy instruments as 
governance mechanisms to overall policy performance by developing a model for 
tobacco policy effectiveness. Thirdly, I develop and empirically test several hypotheses 
related to propositions in Chapter II. Finally, I discuss the implications for an 
instrumental theory of public policy and introduce how certain features of the multilevel 
context of European Union may influence effective national strategies for controlling 
tobacco.  
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Governance  
 The scholarly use of the term ‘governance’ has evolved over the last half century. 
However, the most consistent characterization of the concept is its functional capability, 
or its mechanisms. Governance represents the combined functions of state and non-state 
actors and policies in affecting target populations in pursuit of policy goals (Kjær, 2004). 
 In organization theory, governance is the combined contribution of management, 
the environment, structure, clientele characteristics and core processes in pursuit of 
organizational success (Lynn et al. 2001). A similar notion of governance is applied in 
bureaucratic agencies, but with more attention give to political actors, values and 
institutions in the environment. For example, bureaucratic values such as accountability, 
efficiency and equity are held by individuals and organizations. These values can be 
mechanisms for shaping how agencies go about their work and can guide how successful 
agencies are at performing core tasks (Meier, 1993).  
 In the political sphere, political property rights and transaction cost politics are 
mechanisms of governance used by rational political actors when operating within the 
constraints of irrational political organizations. Similarly, contracts and the market 
represent mechanisms of governance in the economic study of organizational life 
(Williamson, 1996). Agreements made the during contracting period, for example, guide 
the behavior of organizations, agencies and  individuals in their search of optimal 
performance (Llewellyn, 1931; Alchian and Demsetz, 1972; Macneil, 1974; Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976).  A number of governance mechanisms are used to manage transaction-
cost politics. For example, agency design, rulemaking procedures and structures for 
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controlling the bureaucracy represents factors which can affect policy implementation 
and performance (McCubbins et al, 1987, 1989; Moe, 1990;  Meier and Waterman, 
1997; Wood and Bohte, 2004).  
 These examples point to the proliferation of governance mechanisms, especially 
those which are likely to affect policymaking and outcomes.  
 
Governance Mechanisms, Multilevel Systems and Policy Outcomes  
Policy outcomes can be a function of national and supranational governance 
strategies in the European Union. First, policy instruments can come exclusively from 
national or supranational levels of government or they can be the result of combined 
efforts.  In the case of tobacco control, every European country had adopted exclusive 
national policies towards tobacco before supranational directives were instituted (Shafey 
et al, 2003). A comprehensive evaluation of tobacco control in Europe must provide a 
way to account for the impact of governance strategies from multiple levels of 
government.  
 The policy instrument framework introduced in Chapter II provides a way for 
thinking about how these different policy efforts contribute to outcomes. It is important 
to know how policy instruments function in order to build proper models of policy 
implementation. Even if a policy is implemented properly it still may fail if the 
instrument is inappropriate (Meier and Licari 1998). Therefore, before turning to 
complex implementation theories, it is useful to find out how much of the policy effects 
can be explained simply by instrument performance.  
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 Lowi’s (1964) work was among the first to target policy tools as significant 
political phenomena. In fact, his four-fold classification of policy types (distributive, 
redistributive, regulatory, and constituent) provides a framework for understanding 
dynamic political consequences of varying policies. However, in order to further 
evaluate the richness and complexity of certain polices, it is essential to move beyond 
general policy typology frameworks and begin investigating how multiple instruments 
achieve particular policy goals (Schneider and Ingram, 1990).  Whether national or 
supranational, tobacco control policies and directives have behavioral attributes.  
 Concern over policy instrument effectiveness in politics is consistent with that in 
several disciplinary arenas. For example, economists evaluate levels of economic 
stimulus or constraint based on the utilization of fiscal or monetary policy instruments 
(Woolley, 1988; Ott and Ott, 1968). Business management scholars investigate role of 
patent protection and product standards in explaining research and development funding 
and industry success or failure (Joglekar and Hamburg, 1983). Demographic specialists 
focus on the influence of population policy instruments in achieving desired fertility and 
social development (Pritchett, 1994; Carmen and Potter, 1980).   
 In political science the discussion of policy instruments has been “incidental 
rather than a matter of central concern”  (Schneider and Ingram, 1990, p. 512). This 
deficiency has motivated scholars to refocus attention on the comparative effectiveness 
of different individual instruments (McDonnell, 1988; Gormley, 1987; Salmon, 1981).  
The result has been the development of different policy instrument classification 
systems.  The most common is Schneider and Ingram’s (1990;1997) fivefold 
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differentiation of: 1) authority, 2) sanctions and inducements, 3) capacity building, 4) 
exhortation and 5) learning. These categories were constructed by Schneider and Ingram 
upon analyzing the work of Bardach (1979), Almeria (1987), Gormley (1987) and 
McDonnell (1988) who suggest policy instruments can be labeled a number of ways, 
including as prescriptive, enabling, coercive, catalytic, hortatory, mandatory,  
inducements, and system changing. 
 The ideal method for testing an instrumental theory of public policy is to capture 
the attributes of each policy instrument (both national and supranational) in a dataset and 
determine their unique influence on policy outcomes. Unfortunately, the complexities of 
policy adoption are such that taking that strategy results in a high potential for 
collinearity due to simultaneous adoption of policy instruments over time and across 
member states. Therefore, two approaches are taken to produce evidence testing an 
instrumental theory of public policy.  First, I develop a model using a measure of policy 
which distinguishes among information and command-control instruments. I also 
explore how price policies work in combination with these instruments. Secondly, I 
develop a model using a policy-bundle approach where I create a single measure of non-
price policies (policy scope) and combine it with price policies. I discuss implications 
for using a more aggregate measure of non-price policies on understanding an 
instrumental approach to policy effectiveness. 
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Tobacco Control and Policy Instrument Effectiveness 
Tobacco control is a fertile policy environment in which to study the relative 
effectiveness of  individual and multiple policies. First, tobacco is everywhere. It is 
consumed and controlled in every member state and at the supranational level. 
Therefore, variations in policies and outcomes at all levels provide leverage on 
addressing the following general research question: how are health policy outcomes 
governed by policy instruments in a multilevel system of policymaking?  
Secondly, this policy area provides the opportunity for investigating the 
effectiveness of price and non-price policy instruments targeting one variegated 
population. Finally, this policy context allows me to identify instances where policies are 
working, and under what circumstances.  
 
Developing a Model for Tobacco Policy Effectiveness 
There is a growing concern over population health governance as over half a 
million people within the European Union die each year due to tobacco-related illnesses 
and diseases, especially those associated with cigarette smoking (Aspect Consortium 
2004).  The tobacco epidemic has caught the attention of policymakers at all levels of 
government. They seek ways to mitigate rising negative health consequences associated 
with consumption, morbidity and mortality (Aspect Consortium, 2004). 
 Policymakers often intervene in the marketplace when public health is at risk.  In 
fact, they often try to mediate adverse health effects by choosing command and control 
policies to regulate food and drug products, medical procedures, alcohol, and tobacco. 
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Aside from Meier and Licari (1998) and Licari (2000), limited empirical work has 
focused on evaluating the effectiveness of multiple policy instruments in the area of 
tobacco and health.  Although largely descriptive, Studlar (2002) has explored the 
transfer of policy instruments used for tobacco control in the United States and Canada. 
Studlar contends that tobacco-control policy research focuses on five main policy 
instruments: regulation (command and control), finance, capacity building, education, 
and learning tools. Each instrument includes sub-areas of interest.   
 Regulatory tools target tobacco advertising, sales, environmental smoke, and 
product ingredients. Financial policy tools propose taxes or levies on tobacco products, 
manipulate agricultural incentives, promote litigation against tobacco manufacturers, and 
address the incentives for smuggling (Studlar, 2002; Pal and Weaver, 2002). Capacity 
building refers to funding for community development of programs to combat tobacco 
use, establishing health councils to monitor tobacco industry activities, and grant 
authority to agencies or councils to monitor industry compliance. Education and learning 
tools include health warning labels, general anti-smoking campaigns, development of 
public health curricula, and can subsume legislative hearings and executive reposts 
related to tobacco control.  
 These categories capture mostly non-price policy efforts. Licari (2000) and Meier 
and Licari (1998) make a case for the importance of studying both non-price and price 
policies when developing empirical models of tobacco control.  
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Cigarette Price-Policy 
 The most common regulatory device for controlling tobacco is through taxation. 
Taxes on cigarettes work causally by affecting the price of cigarettes (Chaloupka and 
Warner, 1999; Licari 2000). Tobacco taxation varies a great deal across Europe. Figure 4 
demonstrates the variation in average price of cigarettes across Europe, 1970-1980.  
 
FIGURE  4  Mean Cigarette Price per Pack (US Cents): 1970-1980 
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Source: OECD National Accounts (2006). 
 
 
During this decade Denmark and the United Kindgom are leaders on real price of a pack 
of cigarettes. France, Spain, and Netherlands come last, with cigarettes costing 
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approximately one-third that of Denmark and the UK. The average range of cigarette 
prices across Europe spans around $0.55 in Spain, to $2.60 in Denmark.  
 From 1980-1990, the range of cigarette prices remains roughly the same, from  
$2.60 in the United Kingdom to $0.55 in France and Spain.  Figure 5 reveals that   
 
FIGURE  5 Mean Cigarette Price per Pack (US Cents): 1980-1990 
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Source: OECD National Accounts (2006). 
 
 
 
Ireland replaces Sweden in the top three countries with cigarettes per pack over $3.00: 
United Kingdom, Denmark, and Ireland.  Portugal and Belgium are the biggest cost 
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movers (increase) from the previous decade, while Denmark, Sweden, Italy, and France 
all experience a drop in the cost of cigarettes. Germany and Austria undergo only slight 
changes over the decade.   
 In the final decade included in this study, 1990-2000, price leaders continue to be 
the United Kingdom, Ireland, Denmark and Sweden. Figure 6 shows how the cost of 
cigarettes goes beyond $4.00 a pack in the United Kingdom. Also, the number of 
countries in the $2.00 to $3.00 range doubles from the previous decade.   
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Source: OECD National Accounts (2006). 
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Spain and Greece continue to lag with price increases, while France makes the biggest 
price increases, more than doubling the price of a pack of cigarettes from the average in 
the previous decade.  
 Taken together, these figures descriptively demonstrate the variation in average 
price for a pack of cigarettes across Europe from 1970-2000. Ultimately, taxation (and 
therefore price increases) controls tobacco consumption by manipulating demand for the 
addictive commodity (see Chapter III).  To the extent that demand elasticities can be 
moved, tobacco economists argue that price policies are the most effective mechanism 
for reducing tobacco consumption (Chaloupka 1991, 1997; Warner et al 1995;  
Wasserman et al 1991). Under this argument, price policies are inversely linked to 
consumption levels:  
Hypothesis 1:  Increases in cigarette price reduce demand for cigarettes. 
 Therefore,  consumption is  modeled  as a function of price: 
O = ƒ (Price-Policy)         [1] 
where O is some policy outcome, cigarette consumption, modeled as a function of the 
price of cigarettes, which reflect taxation changes. While this argument [1] has merit, it 
is critical to consider countervailing messages sent to consumers when governments use 
tobacco taxation as a deterrent: 1) cigarette taxes provide useful revenue for government, 
so consumption is profitable and 2) price increases are meant to deter consumption of an 
unhealthy commodity.  
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 Price policies act as uniform market mechanisms with the goal of making it in 
consumers’ self-interest to reduce consumption. The overarching goal is to use price 
mechanisms to deter demand of a product, without having to communicate a strong 
statement of preference over whether a product cannot or should not be consumed or 
banned. The consumer still has the choice of buying and smoking cigarettes if willing to 
pay a higher price. Material costs include both those expended at purchase, as well as 
those associated with future health problems. In liberal democracies where governments 
often bear a portion of the cost in providing health coverage, this is a decision the 
government hopes the consumer takes seriously. Many consumers do not consider future 
risks and therefore operate according to what the tobacco economics literature terms 
imperfectly rational addiction models of consumption (Elster, 1979; McKenzie, 1979; 
Winston, 1980; and Thaler and Shefrin, 1981). In order to curb consumption in such 
circumstances all European countries have initiated non-price policies alongside 
taxation. 
 
Non-price Tobacco Policies 
 Price policies dominated tobacco control efforts across Europe until the early 
1980s in most countries, and into the 1990s in places like Austria. The diffusion of 
health information across the developed world, especially that from the 1964 U.S. 
surgeon’s general report, led governments to begin considering specific health risks 
associated with smoking cigarettes. This led to the formation and adoption of non-price 
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instruments to regulate the advertising of cigarettes and environmental smoke, as well as 
to inform citizens of health risks by using information tools such as warning labels on 
tobacco products. Table 1 in Chapter III  captures seven non-price policy instruments 
used to control tobacco in Europe. They are: advertising, sales, environmental tobacco 
smoke, ingredients, health warnings, capacity-building, and educational campaigns. 
 In the tobacco literature it is common to conduct descriptive policy analysis of 
the potential impact of a single policy. Examples include studies of the marketing policy 
outlined in the master settlement agreement between Big Tobacco and the United States 
(Slade 2001), regulation of nicotine delivery systems (Warner et al 1996; Cromwell et al 
1997), restriction of cigarette sales to minors (Rigotti, 2001), and implementation of 
state clean indoor air laws (Schroeder, 2004). However, these policies are often adopted 
and implemented within a larger social regulatory context where other regulations are 
already in effect and policy environments differ with respect to how they support policy 
efforts.   
 Meier and Licari (1998) and Licari (2000) were first to respond to this concern 
by evaluating the effectiveness of tobacco control when policies are implemented in 
combination. Three key U.S. federal policies are analyzed in combination: cigarette 
taxation, cigarette package warning labels (effective January 1, 1966; Fritschler and 
Hoefler 1995), and the television advertising ban in 1971. The proliferation of policy 
instruments across Europe from 1970-2000 makes clear the need for a finer 
determination of what works and how. I build on Meier and Licari’s (1998) framework 
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to address this need.  Within that framework, there are seven main instruments of 
tobacco control. Many of these policies share behavioral assumptions. These underlying 
characteristics enable me to account for European tobacco control efforts using 
combined indicators which reflect common underlying notions by isolating shared 
variance among multiple policy instruments.  
 In building a model of comparative public policy, it is important to first identify 
those policies relevant to the outcomes of interest (e.g., tobacco consumption), and then 
to think about associations among policies. In [1] above I start building a model of 
European tobacco control effectiveness, focusing on price policies. Non-price policies 
are added to that model: 
 O = ƒ (Price-Policy, Non-Price Policies)      [2] 
where O is some policy outcome, cigarette consumption, modeled as a function of the 
price of cigarettes, and non-price policies which are identified qualitatively (see Table 2, 
Chapter III).  These non-price policies [2] alter demand curves of smokers and can be 
broadly sorted conceptually two ways: a) according to whether they convey information, 
or whether they are command and control regulation [3] or b) according to whether their 
behavioral attributes can be captured as a non-price policy bundle [4].10
 
 
10 This strategy is useful when simultaneous policy adoption makes it difficult to disentangle certain 
specific policy-effects given data limitations. 
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O = ƒ (Price-Policy, Non-Price Policies)  
      
      Information Policy Command-Control Policy   [3] 
 
    Non-Price      [4]
            Policy Bundle 
 
Information Policy 
 Like the United States, in Europe the foremost battle to control tobacco from 
both the perspectives of industry and government is on the control of information about 
tobacco products. Many governments wish to uncover and disseminate harmful 
information about tobacco products, while industry representatives work to suppress, 
manipulate, or constrain information touting harmful information of their products.  
Information instruments help governments build negative information campaigns which 
support an overall emphasis on governing and protecting the public health of citizens. 
While information policies can be costly, and heavily dependent on whether they are 
ignored by consumers (Meier and Licari, 1998), many governments use them to aid in 
governing  public health.  
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 The most notable implementation example is the requirement of warning labels 
on cigarette packages. Notwithstanding voluntary agreements, warning labels began to 
appear in national-level legislation around the 1980s across Europe.  Chapter III 
illustrates the variety of labels adopted, some only hinting at possible harmful effects, 
others passing along strong and specific dangers of smoking.11  As of the late 1990s all 
western European countries require warning labels by law to appear on cigarettes 
packages (Aspect Consortium, 2004).  
 Other methods of implementing information include national educational 
campaigns designed to disseminate information on smoking and public health. While 
most European countries likely have anti-tobacco educational campaigns supported by 
state and local governments and non-governmental entities, three countries in the 
European Union have national legislation supporting the dissemination of the dangers of 
tobacco: France, Spain, and Sweden (Shafey et al, 2003).  While coverage on 
educational campaigns varies by country, these initiatives add to overall negative 
information policy emphasized and enforced at the national level.   
 While warning labels and educational campaigns represent different avenues to 
controlling tobacco, as policy instruments they share attributes of providing consumers 
with information, allowing consumers to decide for themselves whether and how much 
risk is acceptable. Policy outcomes, therefore, are expected to respond to regulatory 
efforts aimed at providing information: 
 
11 In Chapter VI, I introduce more recent efforts by the European Union to regulate negative information 
via labels on cigarette packages. 
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Hypothesis 2:  Cigarette demand will diminish as governments adopt policy instruments 
  aimed at correcting information asymmetries associated with tobacco 
  products.    
 
Now the  comparative model [4] is expanded to include these factors: 
 O = ƒ (Price-Policy, Non-Price Policies)     [5] 
  
      Information Policy        Command-Control Policy  
  Health Warnings   
             Educational Campaigns 
 
 
Command-Control Policy 
 In addition to information policies, governments choose among command and 
control (CAC) policy instruments once specific intent to regulate is settled. Tobacco 
control is no exception. Across the European Union, CAC policies have been used to 
restrict the advertising of tobacco products, primarily across television and radio media. 
Though, some restrictions are also enforced across subsets of print media. These policies 
are designed to restrict, or at least constrain, the information provided by tobacco 
companies to sell products to consumers.  
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 Substantial CAC efforts have also been directed towards setting standards and 
restrictions on the ingredients of tobacco products, primarily manufactured cigarettes. 
Limitations are often placed on tar and nicotine yields, as well as on additives which 
make the product more appealing and addictive. Ingredients are often required to appear 
on cigarette packs, so that tobacco companies are held accountable for their contents, 
if/when tested.  These labels also communicate information to consumers, though they 
are often ignored or hard to understand.  Most consumers do not know how to calculate 
risk based off information reported on labels.  
 Setting standards for the restriction of tobacco sales is another CAC effort. 
Minors can be restricted from purchasing or consuming cigarettes in retail stores or from 
vending machines. These policies are designed to curb consumption by restricting access 
to the product. Finally, governments set standards for controlling environmental tobacco 
smoke in public buildings, in transportation vehicles, or in areas where minors are 
present (see Chapter III for more implementation examples).  
 While each of these CAC efforts represent different avenues to control tobacco, 
as policy instruments they share attributes of setting standards for what is permitted, and 
for building in control mechanisms to ensure compliance (see capacity-building 
instruments in Chapters III and VI).  Policy outcomes are expected to respond to those 
instruments which set specific standards and build capacity for regulation: 
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Hypothesis 3: Cigarette demand will diminish as governments adopt policy instruments 
  which standardize regulatory efforts and create capacity for ensuring 
  compliance.    
 
 This differs from information policy instruments which correct information 
inefficiencies so that consumers can decide for themselves whether and how much risk is 
acceptable. Now the comparative model [6] is expanded to include CAC factors: 
O = ƒ (Price-Policy, Non-Price Policies)     [6] 
  
     Information Policy        Command-Control Policy  
  Health Warnings         Advertising  
             Educational Campaigns        Sales 
            Environmental Tobacco Smoke  
                  (ETS) 
            Capacity-Building 
 
 
Multiple Interventions 
 The regulatory environment for tobacco often includes non-price and price-
control efforts aimed at shifting demand. While combined policy efforts may seem 
progressive, policymakers often rush to adopt multiple instruments without 
consideration for how they may detract from overall effectiveness when executed in 
combination. Meier and Licari (1998) are the first to consider how instruments work 
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when used in combination. They argue as non-price regulation is added, less-addicted 
smokers are skimmed off, leaving a pool of highly addicted smokers, making demand 
for cigarettes more inelastic to price. I test this argument in the context of European 
tobacco control:  
 
Hypothesis 4: When information policy instruments are added to the regulatory setting, 
  the effectiveness of price as a disincentive diminishes.  
Hypothesis 5: When command-control instruments are added to the regulatory setting, 
  the effectiveness of price as a disincentive diminishes. 
 
 Another extension of Meier and Licari’s (1998) formal postulate is to test their 
hypothesis on the interaction between command-control and information policies. Since 
I do not have a theoretical expectation for this interaction, I do not test it empirically.  
 
 
Habit Persistence: Robust Contextual Factor 
 While both price and non-price policies are ultimately designed to effect 
consumer demand for tobacco, the unique characteristic of tobacco products is their  
addictive quality. This trait makes shifting demand curves difficult since smokers range 
from highly addicted to not addicted. 
 Within the tobacco control literature, habit persistence is typically taken into 
account by including a measure of past consumption    (Chaloupka and Warner 1999; 
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Becker and Murphy 1988; Lewit, 1989;  Meier and Licari 1998). When controlling for 
price, habit persistence can also be taken as demand elasticity for tobacco products. The 
closer to 1 this number is, the more inelastic demand for this addictive commodity.  
Conceptually, habit persistence captures direct levels of demand, as well as more 
indirect moods in the population where declining consumption may indicate decreasing 
popularity of legitimacy of smoking (Licari, 2000).  
 
Hypothesis 6:  As habit-persistence intensifies, current demand and consumption of 
  tobacco products increase.  
 
 To be aware of addiction when determining the effectiveness of tobacco control 
brings to light the importance of incorporating knowledge of the substantive policy area 
when developing a model. The following addition is made to the comparative policy 
model [7] of tobacco control effectiveness:   
 
O = ƒ (Price-Policy, Non-Price Policies, Robust Contextual Factors)      [7] 
 
  Information Policy       Command-Control Policy          Habit Persistence 
 Health Warnings  Advertising  
 Educational Campaigns Sales 
     Environmental Tobacco Smoke   
                      (ETS) 
     Capacity-Building 
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 In Chapter I, I contend hat policy effectiveness depends not only on appropriate 
selection of policy instruments;  policies are conceived of and implemented within 
policy environments. Whether the policy environment is supportive of tobacco control 
influences the extent to which these price and non-price policy instruments lead to 
effective intervention. Bureaucratic, industrial, and political forces are three dimensions 
of the policy environment which enable and constrain policy effectiveness.  
 
Bureaucratic Influences 
 An instrumental view of policy effectiveness takes into consideration how 
bureaucracies influence policy outcomes. Bureaucracies generally exercise their 
influence in policymaking because they are inherently involved with government 
regulation of industry (Meier, 1993).  
 During the time period under examination, 1970-2000, the most influential 
bureaucracy with a stake in the politics of tobacco across Europe is the public health 
bureaucracy. The presence and strength of public health bureaucracies across member 
states should have two important influences on tobacco control outcomes. First, they are  
uniquely positioned to provide information to the public on health risks associated with 
smoking, thus reducing consumption. Secondly, they can influence political actors to 
increase the scope and severity of price and non-price policy efforts to reduce smoking. 
Such actions align with policy agendas focused on improving public health in an area 
where health is aggressively under assault. Additionally, bureaucracies utilize various 
resources (budget allocations and personnel, for example) to pursue their policy agendas 
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(Rourke 1986), according to their capacity. Increased capacity should lead to efforts 
aimed at governing (improving) public health, by reducing consumption of harmful 
products like cigarettes.  Bureaucratic capacity, specifically via resources, is linked 
inversely to policy outcomes:  
 
Hypothesis 7:  As public health bureaucracies increase their capacity (expenditures) to 
  align efforts with policy agendas focused on improving public health, 
  cigarette demand will diminish. 
 
Industry Influences 
 Tobacco companies and subsidiaries are present in every European Union 
member state (Harvard School of Public Health, 2001). While a stronger industry 
presence can be accounted for in Great Britain, Germany, Italy, and Greece (for 
production, manufacturing, and distribution), the positioning of tobacco firms across the 
European Union is pervasive (United Nations Food and Agricultural Organization, 
2005). This is not to say there are many – in fact, there are only a few firms. They are 
simply spread across the Continent in various ways. 
 Given this presence, industry involvement in the politics of tobacco comes with 
the goal of limiting the extent to which policies regulate its products, especially 
manufactured cigarettes. The industry has a comparative advantage when exerting itself 
politically to constrain, even thwart, policy efforts to reduce consumption. With 
relatively few firms, organizing becomes easier because the collective action problem is 
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curtailed (Olson 1971).   Smaller numbers lower the costs of organizing and ensure 
greater benefits for each individual member (Olson 1971). 
 Even more, institutions  structure the pattern of influence exerted by organized 
groups in the policymaking process, which has relevant implications for policy 
outcomes.  For example, pluralist versus corporatists institutional structures make a 
difference for how these groups are involved in the policy process and how they are 
integrated with other peak organizations at the national level (Schmitter 1982; Lijphart 
1999).   
 While the subject of pluralism and its contrast with corporatism has been a major 
focus of interest group politics in the comparative arena (Almond 1983; Wilson 1990), 
less attention has been given to policy outcomes resulting from these institutional-
guiding processes.  I posit that organized groups from the tobacco industry have more 
success at protecting themselves from regulation in those arenas where they can use 
uncoordinated pluralist arrangements to exercise their comparative advantage in 
organizing, where the potential for integration into the policy process (and fusion to 
government representatives) is less formal, and where the environment for policy 
concertation (Schmitter 1989) does not require a commitment to tripartite pacts with 
national peak organizations, which may dilute their (tobacco industry) message. Within 
pluralist arrangements, many groups traverse in and out of the political arena, often only 
making an appearance and not exerting an influence.  Without a comparative advantage 
in organizing, exerting influence can be difficult because groups are not systematically 
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integrated into existing peak organizations (Lijphart 1999) (e.g., disparate public health 
advocacy groups). 
 Furthermore, the institutional structures of rigid corporatism (where interest 
groups are organized into hierarchical, monopolistic, specialized peak organizations) 
prevent access and integration of a multiplicity of interest groups into certain 
policymaking spheres. These positions are typically reserved for groups representing 
economic affairs (Pekkarinen et al, 1992), not social regulatory affairs, like those 
associated with tobacco control.  
 The enabling characteristics of pluralist interest group arrangements should have 
two important influences on policy performance of tobacco control. First, this 
arrangement allows tobacco firms to strengthen their bargaining position in the 
policymaking process (due to their comparative advantage in organizing over other 
groups), which stands to stabilize if not increase demand of their products.  Secondly, 
being integrated into the political subsystem under these conditions allows tobacco firms 
the strategic opportunity not only to advocate their preferences, but also protect 
themselves from counter-positions, like those presented by public health advocates. 
 Under these circumstances the magnitude of regulatory influence on curbing 
consumption may be reduced or negated entirely.  
 
Hypothesis 8:  In member states where pluralist institutions guide tobacco industry 
  involvement in policymaking, cigarette demand will  increase. 
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Political Factors 
 Institutions which guide the interest group process can also be considered 
political factors. However, there are a number of other political factors to consider, 
though many of them do not provide tractable implications for policy outcomes. In 
covering approaches to tobacco control research, Chapter I explains how direct partisan 
political forces are not easily matched to preferences on tobacco control, nor are they 
stable determinants of tobacco consumption or cigarette tax rates when crudely 
measured (Licari 2000). In the case of the United States, political forces at the state level 
are reduced to whether a state is a “tobacco state”: one that grows or manufactures 
tobacco (Licari 2000).  Across the European Union, however, tobacco firms and 
subsidiaries are present in every member state. It is not useful to apply this method 
(“tobacco state” designation) to EU member states. 
 Other than partisan political factors, there may be important political factors 
specific to the supranational arrangement of the European Union. Two important 
considerations are whether a policy mandate exists for governing public health at the 
European level, and the extent to which national governments have adopting EU 
legislation into their national laws and regulations regarding tobacco control. These two 
factors are considered in Chapter V.  
 Taken together, bureaucratic, industrial, and political forces comprise the policy 
environment portion of the comparative model of tobacco control effectiveness [8], 
which have implications for policy performance:   
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O = ƒ (Price-Policy,          [8] 
 Cost of tobacco, tobacco taxation 
 Non-Price Policies,  
 Information Policies 
 Command and Control Policies 
 Policy bundle  
 Robust Contextual Factors,  
 Habit Persistence, Addiction 
 
 Policy Environment, 
 Bureaucratic Factors  
 Industry Factors 
 Political Factors ) 
 
Measuring Concepts and Data 
 In the previous section, a comprehensive model is developed for determining 
how policy-related concepts are linked to policy performance in the arena of tobacco 
control in the European Union. While this model is portable as a more general model of 
comparative policy effectiveness, this section focuses on operationalizing and measuring 
concepts according to the model [8] in the European context.   
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Dependent variable. For model [8], the dependent variable of interest is the 
number of packs of cigarettes per capita consumed in each member state, 1970-2000. 12 
Chapter I illustrates variation in cigarette consumption over time, and across space. 
Alternative dependent variables could include consumption of pipe tobacco, snuff, or 
hand-rolled tobacco cigarettes. However, because seventy-five percent of tobacco 
consumed in the European Union is in the form of manufactured cigarettes, the most 
valid policy outcome measure is packs of cigarettes consumed per capita in each 
member state, overtime (European Commission Employment and Social Affairs, 2000). 
Data related to tobacco consumption come from the European Health for All database.13  
 
 Price-Policy: Cigarette Price.  Taxes are an important component of price, 
especially for regulated commodities.  Cigarettes are taxed in a variety of ways. 
European taxation practices commonly combine excise taxes and value added taxes 
(VAT). These taxes are reflected in the real price of cigarettes, which are passed along to 
consumers.  As such, the main price-policy indicator is the price of cigarettes per pack 
(US = 1990). Real cigarette prices have also been used in other quantitative studies 
(Becker and Murphy 1988; Barnett 1995; Meier and Licari 1998; Licari 2000). Data for 
cigarette prices come from two sources. Data from 1970-1990 come from  OECD 
National Accounts and Historical Statistics Detailed Tables . Data for prices 1990-2000 
 
12 The following countries are included as part of European Union: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, 
France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and United 
Kingdom. These comprise what is known as EU15, prior to 2004 enlargement.  
13 This database is hosted by the World Health Organization – Regional Office for Europe.  
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are from the World Health Organization Global Status Report on Tobacco or Health. 
Prices are adjusted for inflation. 14  
  
 Policy Instrument Variables.  Policy data come from two major sources: the 
World Health Organization and  the European Commission Directorate-General for 
Health and Consumer Protection.15  For each European Union member state, tobacco 
legislation is coded according to which instruments are used. These are organized 
according to seven categories (see Table 1, Chapter III). Each policy instrument is coded 
as an intervention (Box and Tiao 1975; Meier and Licari 1998). Each intervention 
remains in the dataset unless rescinded by future legislation. Interventions accumulate 
over time in each category. The benefit of accumulated-intervention analysis is the 
preservation of information relating to the existing regulatory environment overtime, 
acknowledging that policies are adopted and remain in force, unless overturned by future 
regulation (Box and Tiao, 1975). This is an innovation in quantitative tobacco control 
research. 
 In order to reflect the theoretical expectation that policy instruments often 
converge on common underlying notions, combined policy indicators are created using 
factor analysis. Two strategies are employed. First, I apply principal component analysis 
based on the theoretical distinction made in the regulatory policy literature between 
command-control and information policies. The scale reliability coefficient among  
 
14 These sources are comparable. Missing data points for all variables are handled using imputation 
calculations (for extensive review of the benefits of imputation in comparative public policy, see 
Granberg-Rademacker, 2005). 
15 Specific by-country sources are referenced in Chapter III.  
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information instruments is, however, calls into question whether this is the most 
appropriate way to categorize these policies.  
 The second strategy assumes no theoretical distinction among policies, only that 
the collective behavioral attributes of non-price policies represent another way to 
determine how policies and outcomes are connected. One factor analysis is performed 
containing all policies using oblique-rotated factors. The retained scores represent a 
measure of policy scope. I report findings for both measurement strategies. 
 
 Robust Contextual Factors: Habit Persistence. Varying demand elasticities for 
cigarettes require the habit-forming nature of cigarette smoking to be considered. Within 
the tobacco control literature, the way to model addictive phenomena is via habit-
persistence, that is, by including a lagged dependent variable as an independent variable 
(Chaloupka and Warner, 1999; Becker and Murphy 1988; Lewit, 1989;  Meier and 
Licari, 1997). As with other independent variables, lagged dependent variables should 
only be included when theoretically appropriate, as is the case with cigarette 
consumption.  Intuitively, incorporating a lagged dependent variable into a model places 
the entire history of the right hand side variables into the equation (Greene, 2003). In the 
case of cigarettes, all of the factors influencing past consumption are controlled for, 
highlighting the effect of new information.16
 
16 One possible statistical disadvantage is that even if errors are not autocorrelated, the lagged dependent 
variable may be correlated with disturbances, resulting in biased estimators.  The degree of bias declines 
substantially as the number of observations increases relative to the estimated parameters.  In the present 
case, the extent of the bias is unlikely to be large given the large N (400+) and the small amount of 
residual serial correlation.  
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 Bureaucratic Factors. The main bureaucracy with a stake in the politics of 
tobacco in Europe is the public health bureaucracy. Public health bureaucracies utilize  
resources to pursue their policy agendas (Rourke 1986), according to their capacity. In 
order to capture bureaucratic capacity, a measure of public health expenditures is 
collected for each year, for each EU member state. This measure is the percentage of 
government health expenditures allocated for public health. These data come from the 
OECD (2003).  
 Industry Factors. Pluralist versus corporatist institutions structure the pattern of 
influence organized groups (the tobacco industry) exert in the policymaking process 
(Schmitter 1982; Lijphart 1999).  A measure of interest group pluralism is applied from 
Lijphart (1999) and Siaroff (1999). This is a stable, overtime indicator based on a 
number of factors relevant to the pluralism-corporatism contrast (e.g. presence and 
strength of national peak organizations, process of policy concertation, centralization of 
wage-bargaining, strength of labor unions). The measure ranges from zero, pure 
corporatism, to four, pure pluralism. Table 5 illustrates the variation of this stable 
indicator across European Union member states. Pluralist institutions guiding the interest 
group process are most prevalent in Great Britain (3.50) and Greece (3.50), while more 
corporatist structures are more common in Austria and Sweden. 
 As posited earlier, the tobacco industry may be more likely to establish 
preferences and exercise influence in the policymaking process in more pluralist 
situations, rather than under corporatist conditions, in order to reduce the impact of 
regulations which reduce demand of its products.   
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TABLE 5 Interest Group Pluralism Scores, EU Member States  
 
Country   Pluralism Score         Country         Pluralism Score 
 
Great Britain           3.50          Germany  1.38 
Greece            3.50          Netherlands     1.25 
Spain            3.25          Belgium    1.25 
Italy            3.00          Denmark     1.12 
France            3.00          Finland  1.00 
Portugal           3.00          Austria        .62 
Ireland                      2.88          Sweden    .50 
 
EU15 Average           2.09 
Source: Based on data in Lijphart (1999, 313): 0 = pure corporatism, 4 = pure pluralism. 
Indicators are stable overtime, 1970-2000, with only cross-sectional variation (Lijphart 
1999).  
 
  
Methods and Data Structure 
 The units of analysis in this study are fourteen European Union member states: 
Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, 
Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and United Kingdom. Data limitations prevent 
Luxembourg from being included in the analysis. Data from all fourteen countries are 
pooled over a thirty year period (1970-2000), creating 420 observations.  I use panel data 
diagnostics and modeling techniques to estimate respective parameters.  
 Panel data sets for economic and social science research boast several advantages 
over conventional cross-sectional or time-series data sets (Hsiao, 1985). The most 
important advantage pertaining to this study is the leverage gained through econometric 
estimation and modeling processes.  Pooled data provide a larger number of data points, 
increasing degrees of freedom and reducing collinearity among explanatory variables.  
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This allows for more efficient estimates and, therefore, more reliable inferences and 
generalization to the population.  In order to ensure such benefits, particular attention is 
given to matters related to poolability, heteroskedasticity, autocorrelation, and 
stationarity.  
 Chow tests of common slopes (cross-section stability) support pooling across 
European Union countries (on this topic). However, to subsequently assume errors are 
homoskedastic is a risk. In fact, an amount of heteroskedasticity is expected given the 
differing variances of variables for subsets of countries. In order to constrain the bias of 
any nonrandom error, OLS models are estimated with panel-corrected standard errors 
(Beck and Katz, 2004). In addition, three series are tested for stationarity: cigarette 
consumption, cigarette price, and public health expenditures. It is possible these series 
will not revert back to a constant mean and variance given they can increase and 
decrease without bound (De Boef and Granato 1997).  Therefore it would be consistent  
with the data generating process if they were determined to be non stationary.  
 Stationarity tests for panel data have advanced in the last five years. Until 
recently, it was common to combine individual unit root tests applied on each time series 
(i.e. Dickey-Fuller test, KPSS test, and the Phillips-Perron test) using, and reporting, a 
simple average across units. Unlike the single time series spurious regression literature 
which focuses primarily on whether a series exhibits any trend over time, panel data 
spurious regression estimates give a consistent estimate of “ the true value of the 
parameter as both N and T tend asymptotically” (Phillips and Moon 2000; Baltagi 2005, 
p. 237). This has given rise to a number of panel unit root tests assuming cross-sectional 
 116
 
independence (Maddala and Wu 1999; Levin et al, 2002; Im et al, 2003) dependence 
(Pesaran, 2004; Moon and Pesaran 2004) and cointegration (Pedroni 2004; Larsson et al, 
2001).  
 The Im-Pesaran-Shin panel unit root test is most appropriate for heterogeneous 
panels (Im, Pesaran and Shin 2003) and is employed in this case. All three series 
mentioned above are considered non stationary when this test is applied. Taking the 
first-difference is an appropriate correction for cigarette price. However, when first-
differences of consumption and public health expenditures are taken, overdifferencing is 
evident in the full model: r-squared reduces to zero, the direction, magnitude, and 
significance of these two variables becomes confused. These are common signs of 
differencing when it is not needed. Doing so can generate a moving average process, 
which has implications for the general model (Mills 1990). In sum, cigarette prices are 
non-stationary or I(1) and can be made stationary by differencing once. The other series 
remain partially integrated.   To ensure this does not bias the results, residuals for every 
model are tested for stationarity, using the Im-Peresan-Shin panel unit root test.  
  
Hypotheses 
 Using panel data analysis, I investigate the following hypotheses derived from 
expectations in previous sections: 
Individual Instruments and Policy Performance: 
Hypothesis 1: Increases in cigarette price reduce demand for cigarettes. 
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Hypothesis 2:  Cigarette demand will diminish as governments adopt policy instruments 
  aimed at correcting information asymmetries associated with tobacco 
  products.    
Hypothesis 3: Cigarette demand will diminish as governments adopt policy instruments 
  which standardize regulatory efforts and create capacity for ensuring 
  compliance.    
Multiple Instrument Intervention and Policy Performance 
Hypothesis 4: When information policy instruments are added to the regulatory setting, 
  the effectiveness of price as a disincentive diminishes.  
Hypothesis 5: When command-control instruments are added to the regulatory setting, 
  the effectiveness of price as a disincentive diminishes. 
Bureaucratic, Industry-Political, and Robust Contextual Factors and Policy Performance 
Hypothesis 6:  As habit-persistence intensifies, current demand and consumption of 
  tobacco products increases.  
Hypothesis 7:  As public health bureaucracies increase their capacity (expenditures) to 
  align efforts with policy agendas focused on improving public health, 
  cigarette demand will diminish. 
Hypothesis 8:  In member states where pluralist institutions guide tobacco industry 
  involvement in policymaking, cigarette demand will  increase. 
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TABLE 6 Mapping Hypotheses onto General Propositions  
   
Proposition: Description       Hypothesis: Number 
 
1b: Policy outcomes are unlikely to decline 
in those countries where the tobacco industry has  8 
industry has the opportunity to exert influence 
through pluralist interest-group structures.  
 
2:  Policy outcomes are likely to decline in those  7  
countries where implementation resources are    
available to support tobacco control efforts.     
 
3:  Policy outcomes are unlikely to decline in   6  
countries where addiction is more severe.  
 
 
4: Policy outcomes are likely to decline in those   1-5 
countries where policy instruments overcome  
impediments to policy-relevant action. 
 
 
Two additional hypotheses concerning policy scope are tested in extended analyses. For 
this chapter, these hypotheses map onto propositions coming from Chapter II the 
following way:  
 
Findings 
 Table 7 reports findings for the effectiveness of policy on policy performance, 
taking into consideration individual and combined interventions and bureaucratic, 
industry-political, and robust contextual factors. I test three models: an information 
policy model, a command-control model and a combined policy model.  
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TABLE 7 The Effect of Policy Interventions on Tobacco Consumption in the 
  European Union, 1970-2000 
 
     Model 1    Model 2           Model 3 
Independent Variables         Information     Command-Control     Combined  
     Policy     Policy 
 
Policy Instruments 
 
 Information Policy      -1.131      --   -.918 
       (33.92)             (-1.56)       
 
 Command-Control Policy       --   -.970   -.280 
       (-2.41)           (-0.400) 
 
 Change in Price      -1.750  -1.60            -1.66 
                          (1.98) (-1.81)           (-1.86) 
 
 Price * Information      2.373     --             1.48 
         (3.26)            (0.88) 
 
 Price* Command-Control       --    2.89             1.56 
        (2.17)            (0.57) 
Bureaucratic Factors 
 
     Public Health Expend.     -7.96   -9.09            -8.42 
 (% of Health Expend)    (-1.67)          (-1.88)           (-1.76) 
 
Industry-Political Factors 
 
      Pluralist Institutions      1.05      .847            1.02 
       (2.83)   (2.29)           (2.72) 
 
Robust Contextual Factors 
 
      Habit-Persistence       .894   .890             .890 
                (33.92)           (32.66)        (32.91) 
 
Constant      13.34             15.01        14.10 
       (3.04)             (3.32)         (3.15) 
R-squared         .86       .86              .86 
Significance of IPS W[t-bar]b                          .070     .074            .075 
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TABLE 7 Continued 
 
     Model 1    Model 2           Model 3 
            Information     Command-Control     Combined  
     Policy     Policy 
P> Χ2          .000 .000            .000 
 
ρ (autocorrelation coefficient)    -.119  -.112         -.117 
N     406         406                406 
Dependent variable: Annual Per Capita Cigarette Consumption (Packs) for each country, 1970-2000. 
Information and Command-Control policy indicators are lagged one year. 
  
A Prais-Winsten procedure is used to correct for residual autocorrelation. Standard errors are panel 
corrected and robust to heteroskedasticity and unit correlation. The numbers in parentheses are Z statistics. 
   
aIm-Pesaran-Shin test for residual stationarity. A significant t-bar statistic indicates stationarity. 
 
 
  
 For Model 1, as expected the impact of price and information instruments are 
negative. The price coefficient (-1.75) indicates that a price change of one dollar per 
pack is associated with a reduction in per capita consumption of 1.75 packs.17 The 
lagged dependent variable implies that a price increase will have impacts into the future, 
at gradually declining rates. The total impact of a one dollar increase in the price of a 
pack of cigarettes is 16.51 packs per person. This is a large amount of tobacco and it 
indicates that aggressive use of price policy may be a successful way to dramatically 
reduce consumption.  
 Policy instruments which propagate negative information on the harmful effects 
of tobacco also reduce consumption. As governments increase their adoption of 
                                                 
17 The dependent variable is not logged, so one-unit interpretation is appropriate. Diagnostic tests confirm 
the absence of any aberrant outliers which might have called for taking the natural log of several variables. 
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information policy instruments, consumption decreases by 1.13 packs per person. The 
interaction between changes in price and the adoption of information policy is 
significant and in the expected direction. Because the interaction term for combined 
policy is in the model, the coefficient for price is interpreted as the relationship  
before information policies are added to existing regulation. 
 
 For example, as information policies are adopted, the effectiveness of price as a 
disincentive diminishes (-1.75 + 2.37 = 0.62).18  This implies that as information policies 
are added to the regulatory fabric, price increases need to become quite large to have the 
same impact as before.  
 Also, the addictive nature of tobacco generates a large positive coefficient (.894) 
for the lagged consumption variable: habit persistence. This is consistent with 
expectations associated with the robust inelasticity of addictive commodities. Despite 
this, a one percent increase in public health expenditures reduces consumption by 
approximately eight packs per person, annually, even when controlling for industry 
efforts to use pluralist institutions to stabilize (even increase) demand for tobacco 
products. More pluralist policymaking processes are associated with an increase in 
tobacco consumption of approximately one pack per person, annually.   
 Model 2 reports similar findings. Past consumption remains inelastic (.89) and 
price and command-control policies reduce consumption. A one dollar change in price is 
associated with a decrease of one and a half packs of cigarettes per person, annually. The 
 
18 While this demonstrates how price incentives diminish, the positive .62 cannot be interpreted as being 
correlated with an increase in consumption, since the value passes through zero. 
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magnitude of this impact is diminished as command-control policies influence less-
addicted smokers, leaving only those more highly addicted (-1.60 + 2.89 = 1.29). The 
independent effect of command-control policies, after considering price changes and 
other factors remains notable. As government adds command-control policies to the 
regulatory milieu, consumption decreases by approximately one pack per person. The 
total impact of command-control policies (dividing the command-control slope by one 
minus the slope of the lagged dependent variable) is a long-run reduction of 
approximately nine packs per person. Expenditures by the public health bureaucracy also 
significantly contribute to a decline in cigarette consumption (b = -9.09), even when 
taking into consideration increases in consumption due to industry efforts to constrain 
regulatory efforts (pluralism b = .847).  
 In Model 3, the most significant determinants of consumption are price policy, 
public health expenditures, past consumption and pluralist institutions. Command-
control and information policies (and their interactions with price) become insignificant. 
This could be because the combined model is highly collinear. The issue of collinearity  
among non-price policies provides the first indication that command-control and 
information policies may not be as distinct as argued previously. I propose a solution for 
this issue in the next section that enables me to continue with exploring an instrumental 
theory of policy effectiveness.  
 In sum, Table 7 reports evidence in support of theoretically derived hypotheses. 
In separate models of consumption, non-price policies are linked to reductions in 
consumption. In these instances, as expected, combinations of these policies with price 
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policy diminish their independent effects due to demand-characteristics of the smoking 
population – which range from highly addicted to not addicted.  There is no evidence 
that non-price policies reduce consumption when they are placed in a single model. Price 
policies, bureaucratic factors, industry-political factors and habit-persistence remain 
robust in reducing consumption in the combined context.  
 
Further Analysis 
 Up to this point I have made the case that information and command-control 
policies work differently in how they affect consumption and are therefore distinct. 
While these instruments are coded separately, in reality there are instances of multiple 
instruments being adopted within one piece of legislation, making it more difficult to 
determine their distinctive impact on consumption. To deal with this problem I develop a 
policy-bundle measure of non-price policies. This collective measure still captures 
collective behavioral attributes, but prevents any finer assessment of individual non-
price policies in reducing consumption. This strategy allows me to continue applying an 
instrumental perspective;  one that distinguishes between price and non-price policies, 
rather than among non-price policies.  
 When non-price policies are correlated with one another because of the issue of 
simultaneous adoption, factor analysis can be used to develop a collective measure for 
empirical analysis. In Chapter III I performed factor analysis using oblique rotation, 
which assumes correlation among items. From this analysis I derive a measure for non-
price policy bundles. This measure captures the scope of non-price policy instruments 
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used each year in each country. Similar data-reduction strategies have been used in the 
social-regulation literature (Durant and Legge 1993; Haider-Markel 1998).  As the  
scope of non-price tobacco interventions increases, policy outcomes are expected to 
respond favorably: consumption is expected to decline (Hypothesis 9).  
 This expectation, however, cannot be considered apart from pervasive strategies 
used by the tobacco industry, which serve to protect and expand demand of their 
products. Whether the United States, Canada, or across Europe, one of the most popular 
strategies used by the tobacco industry is to convince governments of their position 
within the larger state economy. Primary attention is given to the macro contribution of 
the commodity by way of production and manufacturing (Studlar 2002). This strategy 
has been successful during the time period under investigation. In fact, not only have 
some governments subscribed to economic-contribution arguments, many have 
historically subsidized the efforts of the tobacco industry. I expect policy efforts to be 
less effective at curbing consumption when controlling for the contribution of tobacco 
manufacturing to the larger economy (Hypothesis 10).  
 Table 8 reports findings for the initial analysis on policy scope and policy 
performance.  Model 1 demonstrates the independent influence of price and non-price 
policies in reducing consumption . As the scope of non-price policies increases, 
consumption declines at a rate of approximately one pack per person. The full impact of 
additional non-price policies overtime contributes to a reduction in smoking by almost 
ten packs per capita. Habit-persistence and interest-group pluralism remain associated  
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TABLE 8 The Effect of Policy Scope on Tobacco Consumption in the  
  European Union, 1970-2000 
 
Independent Variables   Model 1  Model 2 
        Non-Price Policy Non-Price*Price Policy 
 
Policy Instruments  
 
 Scope        -1.04   1.50     
                   (-2.66)            (1.13)       
 
 Change in Price                 -1.70             -2.00 
                            (-1.92)           (-2.27) 
 
 Price * Scope                 -1.22  
                             (-2.06) 
 
Bureaucratic Factors 
 
     Public Health Expend.       -8.87            -10.26 
 (% of Health Expend)      (-1.89)           (-2.23) 
 
Industry-Political Factors 
 
      Pluralist Institutions                   .767    .703 
           (2.12)            (2.00) 
Robust Contextual Factors 
 
      Habit-Persistence            .892     .893 
                 (33.87)           (34.04) 
 
Constant      14.93             16.29 
                  (3.44)             (3.78) 
R-squared             .85                .86 
Significance of IPS W[t-bar]b                                          .073     .071 
P > Χ2              .000     .000 
ρ (autocorrelation coefficient)               -.104              -.118 
N               406          406 
Dependent variable: Annual Per Capita Cigarette Consumption (Packs) for each country, 1970-2000. 
Scope variable lagged one year. 
 
Sample is split around the mean of the percent value-added to national manufacturing made by tobacco. 
The mean contribution is 16.21 percent.  
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TABLE 8 Continued. 
 
A Prais-Winsten procedure is used to correct for residual autocorrelation. Standard errors are panel 
corrected and robust to heteroskedasticity and unit correlation. The numbers in parentheses are Z statistics. 
   
aIm-Pesaran-Shin test for residual stationarity. A significant t-bar statistic indicates stationarity. 
 
 
with increases in consumption, while price-changes and public health expenditures 
continue to be related to decreases in consumption.   
 Model 2 reports findings when policy scope is interacted with price policy.  The 
independent effect of non-price policies becomes insignificant. The impact of price 
policy when non-price policies are present cannot be determined since the main effect of 
policy scope is insignificant. Despite this, cigarette price, public health expenditures, 
pluralist interest group structures and addiction significantly influence consumption in 
expected ways. 
 Table 9 reports evidence on the impact of tobacco manufacturing on 
consumption. Non-price policies are not a significant factor in reducing consumption 
when controlling for the contribution of tobacco manufacturing to the larger economy. 
Price policies remain a powerful tool in reducing consumption. Support from the public 
health bureaucracy also continues to significantly impact consumption in a positive 
manner. Tobacco manufacturing, pluralist institutions and addiction lead to increases in 
consumption. Comparing these results to Table 8, there is no evidence suggesting that  
strategic positioning of the tobacco industry in the larger economy influences the  
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TABLE 9 The Effect of Policy Scope on Tobacco Consumption in the  
  European Union when Tobacco Manufacturing is Considered, 1970-
  2000. 
        
Independent Variables 
 
Policy Instruments  
 
 Scope                 1.32      
                            (0.98)                  
       
 Change in Price                 -2.08                  
                                    (-2.35)                  
  
 Price* Scope              -1.10 
              (-1.83) 
  
Bureaucratic Factors 
 
     Public Health Expend.               -9.22        
 (% of Health Expend)              (-2.02)                 
 
Industry-Political Factors 
 
      Pluralist Institutions                   .766         
                           (2.18)        
Robust Contextual Factors 
 
      Habit-Persistence          .874           
                          (29.98)                 
 
Tobacco Manufacturing     .146 
                (1.80) 
 
 
Constant                14.58                  
                             (3.52)                 
R-squared             .86          
Significance of IPS W[t-bar]b                                                           .017          
P > Χ2              .000          
ρ (autocorrelation coefficient)                          -.103        
N                          420    
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TABLE 9 Continued. 
 
Dependent variable: Annual Per Capita Cigarette Consumption (Packs) for each country, 1970-2000. 
Scope variable lagged one year. 
 
Sample is split around the mean of the percent value-added to national manufacturing made by tobacco. 
The mean contribution is 16.21 percent.  
 
A Prais-Winsten procedure is used to correct for residual autocorrelation. Standard errors are panel 
corrected and robust to heteroskedasticity and unit correlation. The numbers in parentheses are Z statistics. 
   
aIm-Pesaran-Shin test for residual stationarity. A significant t-bar statistic indicates stationarity. 
 
 
contribution of other robust factors in determining consumption outcomes. These results 
provide mixed evidence in support of the original hypothesis. Tobacco manufacturing  
does lead to an increase in consumption, but does not effect how policies, bureaucratic, 
industry-political, and robust contextual factors influence consumption.  
 
Conclusion 
 Overall, I find mixed support for theoretically derived hypotheses. The most 
consistent findings are those coming from the policy environment. Implementation 
resources from the bureaucracy and structures guiding the way in which powerful groups 
engage the policymaking process are significant factors in reducing consumption. The 
magnitude effect of public health expenditures is notable. Across six models this 
variable contributes to a reduction in consumption in the range of four and twelve packs 
of cigarettes per capita. Across the lifetime of data under observation, the impact is 40-
120 packs per capita annually. This is the largest impact of any variable across models. 
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The most effective strategy for controlling tobacco may be to increase the capacity of the 
bureaucracy to exercise its expertise in governing public health issues.  
 Another consistent finding is the role pluralist institutions play in promoting 
consumption. These institutions benefit the tobacco industry by allowing them the 
opportunity to engage the policy process in a way that limits regulation over their 
products. Public policies to control tobacco have been less successful across the models. 
While price policies consistently contribute to reducing consumption, the evidence for 
non-price policies is mixed. In some cases, non-price policies have an independent effect 
on consumption. In others, they drop out of significance. They also lessen the impact of 
price policy in some instances. In these cases, there is compelling evidence confirming 
Meier and Licari’s (1998) formal postulate that combining policy instruments results in 
an overall impact less than the sum of their parts. This is the first study to investigate the 
postulate cross-nationally, and with consideration for the larger policy environment.  
 In the end, when comparing instruments, price policy outperforms non-price 
policy-bundles. The collective attributes of non-price policies are not enough to reduce 
consumption when controlling for other instruments and the larger policy and political 
environment. Finally, the unique characteristic of tobacco being addictive poses many 
challenges to governing public health through regulatory efforts. A model of policy 
effectiveness must consider such challenges when evaluating how policy outcomes 
respond to such efforts.  When deciding if and how to regulate consumption, 
governments would do well to consider: 
 the aggregate addiction of the target population,  
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 the capacity of public health bureaucracies to align efforts with policy agendas 
focused on improving public health, 
 the extent to which pluralist institutions guide industry involvement in 
policymaking, 
 whether information policy instruments are aimed at correcting information 
asymmetries associated with tobacco products, 
 the extent to which command-control policies standardize regulatory efforts and 
create capacity for ensuring compliance, 
 whether price and non-price policies are independently and jointly effective, 
 the degree to which important actors in the policy environment strategically 
position themselves according to value-added contributions in matters important 
to the government, such as the economy. 
  
 The next step in the study involves a careful look at important political factors 
specific to the supranational arrangement of the European Union. Two important 
considerations are whether a policy mandate exists for governing public health at the 
European level, and the extent to which national governments have to adopt European 
Union legislation into their national laws and regulations regarding tobacco control. 
These two factors are considered important when comparing public policies in multilevel 
systems of governance, particularly with respect to tobacco control. How do policy 
outcomes respond to regulatory efforts when elements of the supranational arrangement 
are accounted for?  
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CHAPTER V 
TOBACCO CONTROL AND SUPRANATIONAL GOVERNANCE 
 
This chapter extends findings from chapter IV and considers how policy 
outcomes respond to policy efforts when taking into consideration attributes of 
Europeanization.  Ultimately, this fits into my broad concern with how public policies 
can be conceived of as mechanisms of governance; how they help negotiate the evolving 
relationship between states and societies. 
First I discuss how policy directives connect the supranational (EU) level of 
governance with member state policy efforts to control tobacco. This discussion is 
situated against a background of the general role of policy in the Europeanization 
process. Secondly, I explore the role of supranational mandates in governing policy 
outcomes at the national level. I empirically investigate whether supranational mandates 
have demonstrable effects on the variation of policies pursued across the European 
Union and tobacco consumption. Finally, I present findings and implications for 
European tobacco control specifically, and the role of supranational governance 
arrangements in the study of comparative public policy, generally.  
 
Tobacco Control Directives and European Union 
 The European Union is one of the most significant laboratories of supranational, 
multilevel governance in modern history. In order to properly place tobacco control 
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research within the political literature on ‘Europe’ it is necessary to take into account 
two broad developments related to public policy within the European enterprise: 
European integration and Europeanization.  Europeanization is conceptually large and 
considers processes through which EU dynamics, whether political, economic or social, 
become part of the organizational logic of national politics and policymaking (Harmsen 
and Wilson, 2000).19  European integration is part of the Europeanization process and is 
more narrowly focused on processes of “policy formulation by a wide range of actors -- 
representative of governmental as well as non-governmental entities, of member states 
as well as of the European Union – engaged in decision making at the European Union 
level. Such decision making, including both EU level processes and its outcomes, 
generate the economic, institutional, and ideational forces for change in member-states’ 
policies, practices, and politics” (Schmidt, 2001, p. 20 ). Theories of political integration 
predict that policymaking at the EU level increases the probability of achieving policy 
goals – goals designed to benefit EU member states and their citizens.  
Generally, public policies are inextricably bound with governmental and 
institutional bodies in which they are formulated, implemented and evaluated. In 
multilevel systems of governance, where delegation of authority exists between levels of 
government, this truism comes to life, as does its complexity. For example, the European 
level of policymaking – the identification of relevant actors, sources of power and 
 
19 The importance of this process has become more considerable as scholars “of a wide 
range of government activities, including industrial, regional, social, and environmental policies, 
have found they can no longer understand [national] processes and [policy] outcomes that 
interest them without addressing the role of the European Union.” (Pierson, 1996, p. 130). 
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influence, and capacity to exercise power – is broadly envisaged within a larger context 
of positive delegation of authority running between Brussels and member states. These 
rules of the game, which extend into and from various political entities make patterns of 
influence in the policy process difficult to disentangle, and brings to mind a policy-
quagmire. 
 Within the European Union, there exists much debate on the question of 
supranational influence on member state functioning.  Theories of integration, such as 
intergovernmentalism and neofunctionalism, are at the heart of understanding the impact 
of political integration and predict that supranational policymaking will increase the 
probability of achieving policy goals salient to Europe.  On the one hand, 
intergovernmentalism suggests that public policy coming from the supranational level 
reflects state-centric diplomacy whereby member states are super-sovereign and seek to 
maximize their own advantage (Garrett, 1992; Moravcsik, 1993; Pierson, 1996). From 
this perspective, policy outcomes are a consequence of member state preferences, which 
are more likely to be heavily weighted and reflected in European directives, orders and 
legislation.   
This is quite different from policy outcomes predicted by the neofunctionalist 
theoretical perspective. Rather than a member-state centric influence, neofunctionalists 
attribute greater autonomy to supranational actors who often act independently in the 
policymaking process – as in, for example, the Commission or the European Court of 
Justice. In this case the scope of member state authority appears far more circumscribed, 
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and “both the interventions of other [non-state] actors and the cumulative constraints of 
rule-based governance more considerable” (Pierson, 1996, 131). 
Supranational directives reflect combined notions of intergovernmentalism and 
neofunctionalism, and have been the most common instrument of tobacco control at the 
EU-level. Supranational directives are “binding recommendations upon each member 
state to which they are addressed, but leave to national authorities the choice of form and 
methods” (Nugent, 1999, p. 246). Directives communicate policy principles that member 
states must achieve (neofunctionalism),  but can pursue by appropriate means under their 
respective national, constitutional, administrative and legal systems 
(intergovernmentalism)  (Nugent, 1999). Directives are also an instrument of policy 
harmonization, which is a major goal and characteristic of Europeanization. This 
supranational course of action is traditionally accepted as a means for increasing the 
probability of achieving desired policy outcomes; and furthermore that the European 
Union enterprise provides some value-added function to what member-states can 
achieve on their own, or in intergovernmental, regional, or dyadic policy exchanges.  
During the time under study, 1970-2000, there were six major tobacco control 
directives adopted by the European Union dealing with labeling, advertising, ingredients, 
and taxation (Table 10). These directives were concerned with harmonization and 
approximation of laws and practices of tobacco control activity across the Union. 
Therefore, they were applicable to all member states. All EU directives considered in 
this study were adopted between 1989-1998, when supranational progress in the arena of  
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TABLE 10 Supranational Directives for Tobacco Control Adopted by European 
  Union 
 
Directive/Year        Policy Instrument 
 
    Command-Control        Information 
 
552/1989   Advertising: Regulation  
    constraining the use of  
    television advertising for 
    tobacco products 
 
 
622/1989   Ingredients: Tar and nicotine  Labeling: Requires 
    yields must be measured and   all packs of cigarettes 
    verified    to carry a health 
         warning 
 
 
239/1990   Ingredients: Sets new maximum 
    tar yield of cigarettes 
 
 
 
41/1992   Sales: Restriction on sales  Labeling: Makes 
    should reflect a priority of  previous health 
    health protection, but not  warnings more 
    impede the Internal Market.  Specific 
 
 
 
79/1992   Taxation: Requires a specific 
    level of excise duty be charged 
    for tobacco products. 
 
 
43/1998   Advertising: Bans tobacco 
    advertising in the EU  
Source: Gilmore and McKee (2004). 
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public health was on the rise (Gilmore and McKee, 2004). However, the pace slowed 
down considerably once a mood of caution about the pace of change in Europe  
developed and the principle of subsidiarity was implemented in 1992 (Gilmore and 
McKee, 2004). This principle clarifies the role of supranational governance in areas of 
policy competence better served by member-state action (Nugent, 1999). The Treaty 
Establishing the European Community (TEC) holds that: “The Community shall act 
within the limits of the powers conferred upon it by  this Treaty and of the objectives 
assigned to it therein. In areas which do not fall within its exclusive competence, the 
Community shall take action, in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity, only if and 
in so far as the objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the 
Member States and can therefore, by reason of the scale or effects of the proposed 
action,  be better achieved by the Community. Any action by the Community shall not go 
beyond what is necessary to achieve the objectives of this Treaty” (Article 3b, TEC).  
 This article simply implies policies should be decided at the national, regional or 
local level, whenever possible (Nugent, 1999). Before the principle of subsidiarity was 
in place (pre-1992), a number of European Council directives were adopted to control 
tobacco.  Between 1992 and 2000 only one directive was passed (EurLex, 2005).  The 
first major European Council directive relevant to existing member states was enacted in 
October 1989. This directive prohibits tobacco advertising on television by controlling, 
more strictly, the promotion and production of television programs. It specifically 
prohibits the representation of misleading information of tobacco products and services 
to potential consumers, while also discouraging behavior prejudicial to consumer health 
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(Eurlex, 2005).  Member states are required to pursue rules and procedures which ensure 
these standards of regulation.  
The second major directive shifted attention towards regulating ingredients and 
labeling of tobacco products.  The main goal of the directive is to uphold a high level of 
health protection by reducing the harm done to health by tobacco addiction. In order to 
achieve this policy aim, tar and nicotine yields are required to be measured and verified 
according to international standardization (ISO) methods (EurLex, 2005).  These yields 
are required to appear on cigarette packs along with general warnings of health risks of 
tobacco consumption. This directive imposes a community-wide requirement that all 
packs of tobacco products carry the general warning, “tobacco seriously damages 
health” (WHO, 2004). Health warnings are to be printed in the official language(s) of the 
country of final marketing, located on the most visible surface, alternated with more 
specific warnings (EurLex, 2005).  
Supranational product regulation began in 1990 with a directive intended to 
establish new maximum tar yields of cigarettes. The tar yield of cigarettes marketed in 
member states is not to exceed 15 mg per cigarette (through 1992) and 12 mg per 
cigarette (through 1997). Measurement and verification of this ingredient is to be 
managed according to ISO standards (EurLex, 2005). 
In 1992 a directive was adopted requiring cigarette packs to carry more specific 
warnings. Compulsory rotation of health warnings is instituted and member states are 
strongly encouraged to attribute and indicate a source of authority for health warnings 
(for example, a surgeons’ general or the Department of Public Health, etc). While the 
 138
 
restriction of tobacco sales are supported in this directive, the Council is careful to 
protect against government action which may impede functioning of the internal market 
(EurLex, 2005). Finally, this directive encourages member states to couple their 
regulatory efforts with health education programs during years of compulsory education 
and with general public information campaigns of the harm of tobacco consumption 
(EurLex, 2005).  
European Union regulation of tobacco by means of taxation began in 1992. This 
directive requires member states to impose minimum consumption taxes that comprises: 
specific excise duties, a proportional excise duty calculated on the basis of the maximum 
retail selling price, and a VAT (value-added tax) proportional to the retail selling price. 
The overall tax rate is to be at least 57% of the retail selling price for cigarettes in 
highest demand. 
The most controversial supranational directive related to tobacco advertising was 
implemented in 1998. Initially, this directive banned tobacco advertising in all 15 EU 
member states, covering all forms of advertising apart from television advertising 
already covered by previous directives. Any existing sponsorship of events or activities 
was only allowed to continue for a period of eight years, ending no later than October 
2006. Though not discussed extensively, the European Court of Justice overturned this 
directive and the Council implemented less severe advertising bans (Official Journal, 
152).  
Finally, there are additional directives related to tobacco control beyond the time 
frame of this project. However, these directives are important to the discussion of the 
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European Union involvement with voluntary, international agreements on tobacco 
control. These are discussed in the next chapter on the future of tobacco control research 
in Europe.
The question of how to gauge the impact of these directives is important. There 
has only been one quantitative study of the impact of EU directives on tobacco 
consumption (see Licari, 2000). In this paper, directives are considered as separate 
policy interventions from national policy interventions to regulate consumption. This 
method is not consistent with how directives are theoretically applied in the context of 
multilevel governance.  Directives are general policies designed to shape national-
specific strategies to achieving specified policy goals (Nugent, 1999). Perhaps a better 
way to gauge the role played by these directives in European tobacco control is to 
determine whether they assist in harmonizing policies across member states.20 Two 
approaches are taken to demonstrate whether harmonization may be occurring. First, I 
gather data on the variation of non-price policy bundles across member states, annually. 
Average policy variation is graphed over time with markers indicating the integration of 
supranational directives. Because of simultaneous adoption issues, I cannot make a 
precise determination of whether certain types of non-price policies are converging 
versus others. But, I can capture overall tendencies. I expect supranational directives to 
lead to the harmonization of tobacco control policies across member states overtime. 
Secondly, I apply this method to cigarette price over time. I expect variation to narrow 
after the adoption of supranational directives targeting price. Together these two items 
 
20 Given data limitations I cannot construct a measure of harmonization. 
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produce evidence of harmonization, but do not offer a reliable measure of harmonization 
which could be used in an empirical test of consumption. Proposition 6 in Chapter II, 
therefore, cannot be fully tested. This proposition states that supranational directives 
may lead to harmonization of tobacco control policies across member states and 
consumption is likely to decline in those countries where efficiency-gains are realized 
through the harmonization process.   
Figure 7 reports the average variation of non-price policies implemented by 
European countries from 1970-2000. Because the variation in non-price policies is based 
on the mean level of policy, caution has to be exercised when making claims about 
convergence. Therefore, I add additional evidence from the variation of price policy in 
Figure 8.  Figure 7 reports a gradual overall increase in the average variation of non-
price policies across member states. This confirms that a great of non-price policies are 
adjusted for nation-specific concerns. This does not mean that harmonization is 
nonexistent. From 1989-1992 there is a major increase, followed by a slower rate of 
increase. The latent effect is consistent with the assumption that it takes some time to 
harmonize policies once directives are adopted. The second indication of harmonization 
occurs between 1996-1999, when policy variation declines.  
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FIGURE 7:  Variation of Non-Price Policies in Europe: 1970 - 
   2000 
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Source: Shafey et al, 2003. 
 
 Figure 8 reports evidence of the average variation in the price of cigarettes over 
time. Cigarette price is the best proxy for government policies which target taxation of 
addictive commodities. Large increases in the early 1990s are mostly driven by several 
countries that began aggressively taxing cigarettes, such as the United Kingdom. There 
is evidence of harmonization from 1994-2000, when variation in price declines. Across 
both accounts there is evidence suggesting policy harmonization is occurring from the  
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FIGURE 8:  Variation in Price Policy in Europe: 1970 – 2000 
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mid and late 1990s to 2000. A longer time series would help support this claim, but that 
option is not possible given data limitations.  
In the next section I contribute more evidence for how Europe matters in 
controlling tobacco. Specifically, I focus on the role of supranational mandates play in 
reducing consumption. Supranational mandates have been largely overlooked in policy- 
performance studies.  
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Mandate for European Health Governance: Treaty on European Union 
At the European Union level, there is much concern over the continued 
consumption of tobacco products, especially manufactured cigarettes. This is due to 
increasing numbers of health-related problems associated with consumption, as well as 
the incidence of consumption itself. Over forty percent of EU citizens continue to 
consume tobacco products, mainly through smoking cigarettes (Economic and Social 
Committee Report, 2001). While the incidence of smoking has been in decline for a 
number of decades, the rate of decline has fallen considerably in recent decades. From 
the view of the Community, the EU is in position to facilitate a more comprehensive 
overall strategy to combat smoking (Aspect Consortium, 2004). Therefore, the 
Commission works alongside member states to bring tobacco policy into harmonization, 
hopefully improving the epidemic by contributing to overall decreases in tobacco 
consumption. 
Ultimately,  policy output the European multilevel system of governance is the 
result of complex nested routines (Nugent, 1999). These nested routines are governed by 
a system of positive, legal-political authority.  The positive legal authority by which the 
EU controls tobacco comes from the Maastricht Treaty (or, Treaty on European Union). 
In 1992, the TEU was drafted after the relaunching of integration through the Single 
European Market program. There was a “growing acceptance of the need for a social-
equity dimension that would offset some of the liberal market/deregulatory implications 
of the single market” (Nugent, 1999, p. 60). Most member states were interested in 
deepening integration efforts by adding a social dimension to the existing economic 
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mission.  The TEU created the ‘European Union’ based on three pillars: the European 
Communities, a Common Foreign and Security Policy, and Cooperation in the Fields of 
Justice and Home Affairs (Nugent, 1999). Within the first pillar, there were major 
developments in two areas: EU institutional changes, and policy changes. Institutional 
revisions helped improve various supranational structures and decision-making 
processes by making them more efficient and democratic in nature (Nugent, 1999).  On 
the policy side, the European Union’s policy competence was extended to include the 
management of social policy, including several public health matters.  
Article 152 within the first pillar states that, “a high level of human health 
protection shall be ensured in the definition and implementation of all Community 
policies and activities” (EurLex, 2005).  More specifically, Article 152 “provides that 
Community action shall be directed towards improving public health, preventing human 
illness and diseases, and obviating sources of danger to human health. Such action shall 
cover the fight against the major health scourges, by promoting research into their 
causes, their transmission and their prevention, as well as health information and 
education” (EurLex, 2005).  
In its response to new health provisions in the TEU, the Commission established 
a framework for action in the field of public health to ensure compliance with 
supranational law (EurLex, 2005). Tobacco control is integrated into three portions of 
this framework: promotion of health, education and training; curbing the cancer 
epidemic; and, prevention of pollution-related diseases. Mobilization of government 
action in these arenas is expected to remedy, in part, the scale of the problem of the 
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damage to health from tobacco consumption.  The Commission response calls for 
coordination among member states’ policies and programs towards ensuring a high level 
of human health protection. Additionally,  the Commission reserves the obligation (by 
law) to make any useful initiative to promote coordination, including developing 
evaluative criteria, which may compel compliance (EurLex, 2005).  
Actions taken in the TEU, European Community policies represented in the first 
pillar, and the Commission’s framework for coordinated action establish a supranational 
policy mandate. This mandate establishes incentives for member state compliance of 
both current directives which are part of national legislative action on tobacco and for 
other national policies currently in force. Additionally, the harmonization effect of 
supranational policy mandates may create efficiency-gains in member state-efforts to 
achieve policy goals. For these reasons, I contend that supranational mandates represent 
a policy-feature of European integration which is overlooked in its ability to stimulate or 
dampen the effectiveness of government action at the member state level.  
By creating a larger macro-incentive policy context, there may also be 
implications for factors outside the scope of tobacco policy to influence tobacco 
consumption across the Union.  For example, the previous chapter presented evidence of 
the following factors contributing to reduced cigarette consumption: robust contextual 
factors, pluralist interest group structures, bureaucratic factors, policy scope, and 
economic factors. Does the establishment of a supranational policy mandate have 
implications for if and how these factors influence tobacco consumption?  
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Empirical Investigation of a Public Health Mandate 
 To evaluate whether supranational policy mandates influence the effectiveness of 
government action to control tobacco consumption across member states, the 
comparative model of tobacco control effectiveness from Chapter IV is employed: 
O = ƒ (Price-Policy,          [9] 
 Cost of tobacco, tobacco taxation 
 Non-Price Policies,  
 Policy-bundle of all non-price policies 
 Robust Contextual Factors,  
 Habit Persistence, Addiction 
 
 Policy Environment, 
 Bureaucratic Factors  
 Industry Factors 
 
 Measures of these factors follow the previous chapter. The dependent variable, 
O, is a measure of cigarette consumption: packs of cigarettes per capita consumed 
annually in each member state (European Health For All Database, 2004).  Tobacco 
taxation is reflected in the real price of cigarettes. The main indicator of price policy is 
the price of cigarettes per pack (US = 1990) (OECD, 2002).  Non-price policies are 
included as the factor score of all non-price policy instruments: policy scope in a given 
year.  Habit persistence is captured with an autoregressive measure of cigarette 
 147
 
                                                
consumption, lagged from the previous years’ consumption level.  Bureaucratic capacity 
to assist in curbing consumption is measured with public health expenditures, as a 
percentage of general government outlay for health (OECD, 2003).   
 Lijphart’s  (1997) scores for interest group pluralism provide a measure for how 
institutions structure the pattern of influence of organized groups like the tobacco 
industry. The measure ranges from zero, pure corporatism, to four, pure pluralism.  To 
account for one influence of Europe in curbing consumption by creating a pervasive 
incentive-context for member state compliance, a measure of supranational policy 
mandate is added to the model. This variable takes on the value of zero before the 
ratification of the Treaty on European Union and a value of one in the post-ratification 
period.21  
 The model is tested on a pooled dataset of 14 European Union member states, 
1970-2000.22 While chow tests support poolability, heteroskedasticiy is expected given 
differing variances of variables for subsets of countries. In order to constrain any bias 
which may result from this occurrence, OLS models are estimated with panel-corrected 
standard errors (Beck and Katz, 2004). Appropriate action is taken to achieve 
stationarity in those series where it is likely to arise. Model residuals are tested for 
stationarity, as well, using the Im-Pesaran-Shin test.  
 
 
21 Denmark, France and Germany did not officially ratify the treaty, by way of referendum, until 1993. 
However, member state elites in each country continued operating ‘as if’ the treaty were in force (Nugent, 
1999).  
22 This is consistent with the previous empirical chapter: drawn from the EU15. Luxemborg is not included 
due to data limitations. 
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Hypotheses and Expectations 
 As in the previous chapter, cigarette consumption is expected to decrease when 
price for tobacco rises, policy scope increases, and public health expenditures rise. 
Consumption is expected to increase when demand for tobacco in the previous year 
remains inelastic and when the interest group structure (pluralist) favors tobacco industry 
efforts to divert policies aimed at reducing demand for their products (see Hypotheses 1-
9 in Chapter IV). Incorporating policy-features of European integration allows for 
consideration of how effective these factors remain at influencing consumption, when 
operating in a multilevel system of governance:  
 
Hypothesis 11:  The presence of a supranational policy mandate for public health 
   and tobacco control at the EU level magnifies the impact policy 
   scope, price and bureaucratic factors have on consumption, while 
   diminishing the impact of habit-persistence and structures which 
   support the tobacco industry. 
 
This hypothesis is derived from Proposition 5 in Chapter II which states that 
consumption is likely to decline when national efforts to control consumption occur 
within a supranational context of compliance and commitment to tobacco control, 
established through policy mandates. Proposition 6 which states that supranational 
mandates provide a context of compliance and commitment which gives rise to 
improvements in member state policy performance.  
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Evidence 
 Table 11 presents findings for the expectation that supranational policy mandates 
may add a more nuanced notion of policy effectiveness within multilevel governance 
arrangements. Generally, whether a supranational policy mandate is in force, past 
consumption continues to be the leading determinant of current consumption. Cigarette 
price and public health expenditures also significantly contribute to reductions in 
consumption. Pluralist interest group structures contribute to higher consumption rates, 
while the influence of policy-scope depends on whether a SPM is in force.  
 A more careful comparison of Model 1 and Model 2 uncovers several 
noteworthy magnitude- effects. First, policy-scope significantly decreases consumption, 
when there is a context of supranational commitment to public health and tobacco 
control. There is a statistical difference between coefficients of policy-scope in each 
model.  This finding concurs with the expectation that supranational policy mandates 
may activate and/or reinforce member-state implementation and compliance efforts 
associated with both recent and seasoned legislative action on tobacco control. This 
result, however, cannot be theoretically confined solely to policy-scope; supranational  
mandates work through numerous institutions at the member state level, acting as a 
pervasive agent of governance. 
 For example, compare the statistically larger magnitude-effect of public health 
expenditures on decreasing consumption, from Model 1 to Model 2. This difference 
lends empirical support to how one goal of the public health mandate for tobacco control  
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TABLE 11 The Effect of Policy Scope and Policy Environment Factors on  
  Tobacco Consumption in the European Union when a Supranational 
  Policy Mandate for Tobacco Control is in Force, 1970-2000 
       Model 1  Model 2 
Supranational Policy Mandate         (not In-Force)  (In-Force) 
 
Independent Variables 
 
Policy Instruments  
 
 Scope        -.006       -.244
                            (-0.09)                 (-2.29)
        
 Change in Price        -4.96                  -.2.31 
                                      (-2.23)                 (-2.56) 
   
 Price * Scope        1.56              1.48 
           (0.57)       (0.88) 
 
Bureaucratic Factors 
 
     Public Health Expend.      -6.95       -38.52 
 (% of Health Expend)                 (2.03)                 (-2.10) 
 
Industry-Political Factors 
 
      Pluralist Institutions          .515        2.08 
                    (1.63)       (2.33) 
Robust Contextual Factors 
 
      Habit-Persistence           .930          .874 
                           (45.18)       (30.47) 
 
Constant                11.22                 51.26 
                             (3.09)                 (2.90) 
R-squared             .90         .78 
Significance of IPS W[t-bar]b                                                           .003         .038 
P > Χ2              .000         .000 
ρ (autocorrelation coefficient)                          -.070       -.042 
N                          294   126 
Dependent variable: Annual Per Capita Cigarette Consumption (Packs) for each country, 1970-2000. 
Scope variable lagged one year. 
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Table 11 Continued. 
 
Sample is split around the mean of the percent value-added to national manufacturing made by tobacco. 
The mean contribution is 16.21 percent.  
 
A Prais-Winsten procedure is used to correct for residual autocorrelation. Standard errors are panel 
corrected and robust to heteroskedasticity and unit correlation. The numbers in parentheses are Z statistics. 
   
aIm-Pesaran-Shin test for residual stationarity. A significant t-bar statistic indicates stationarity. 
 
 
(increasing comprehensive capacity to combat the tobacco epidemic) may be linked to 
improved outcomes (decreased consumption).23   
 Past consumption and cigarette price are not statistically different across Model 1 
and Model 2. Perhaps the magnitude-effect of these factors simply remains high no 
matter what additional EU factors are taken into account; they remain robust to policy-
features present in a multilevel context. 
 Finally, caution is warranted when a sample is divided. There are trade-offs to 
inferencing capability when the full-sample is split according to a particular factor – in 
this case whether there is a supranational mandate in force. For example, in the previous 
chapter there is robust evidence that the scope of policy in force at the national level is a 
significant determinant of reduced consumption of cigarettes. In Model 1 (Table 10), 
evidence suggests that this effect disappears absent from a context where there is a 
supranational mandate for public health and tobacco control. These findings are not at 
odds, they simply reflect the possibility that the influence of policy scope on 
                                                 
23 This observation engenders additional interest in how these two factors might link together (more 
descriptively) by way of particular programs, initiatives, educational campaigns, intergovernmental grants, 
etc. 
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consumption may be obscured by the sample-split. As such, these findings come with 
the caveat that more data points on the post-TEU side of policy context may allow for 
this statistical relationship to resurface. This evidence may seem superficial if it is not 
considered a portion of a larger exploration on how Europe matters in the effort to 
control tobacco. The two approaches taken in this chapter represent a starting point for 
studying what could be a productive future enterprise exploring additional supranational 
dimensions of tobacco control.  
 
Discussion and Summary 
Shifting the traditional focus of the policy discussion from institutional (input-
side) matters towards post-decisional policy affairs allows for assessing how policy 
outcomes may respond to national regulatory efforts when elements of Europeanization 
are accounted for. This approach to evaluating whether and how Europe matters to 
policy effectiveness in a setting of multilevel governance contributes to the undeveloped 
discourse in comparative public policy over tobacco control in European Union.  As it 
concerns tobacco control, member-state policies should be evaluated alongside 
supranational mandates which create a context of compliance, and allow for efficiency 
gains in achieving policy goals by way of policy harmonization.  
In this chapter, I take a careful look at how two particular factors specific to the 
supranational arrangement of the European Union might influence policy outcomes: EU 
directives aimed at controlling tobacco, and the presence of a supranational policy 
mandate for public health and tobacco control. For the first factor, I only present 
 153
 
evidence of policy harmonization. I cannot test the link between harmonization and 
outcomes due to data limitations. However, I suggest theoretically how both factors are 
relevant to the success of community-wide tobacco control. Finally, overall evidence, 
evidence supports a framework and method for thinking about the role of different 
supranational governance mechanisms in the study of comparative public policy in 
laboratories of multilevel governance.   
The next step in the study involves bringing together arguments and evidence 
presented throughout previous chapters in an effort to offer substantive and theoretical 
conclusions, discuss the future of tobacco control in the EU, and articulate the 
contribution of this project to the study of comparative public policy and the general role 
of policy in connecting states and societies within evolving systems of democratic  
governance.  
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CHAPTER VI 
  CONCLUSION 
 
A General Model of Comparative Public Policy 
The tobacco epidemic is politically, socially, and economically salient in the 
European Union and around the world. The purpose of this project was to examine the 
politics of tobacco, expressed through public policy, in order to understand why certain 
interventions were better than others in curbing this epidemic. An instrumental theory of 
policy effectiveness was developed to help explain this phenomena. This framework  
guided the identification of policy instruments across space and time, articulated 
common underlying notions of numerous policy efforts across member states, and made 
provisions for how factors in the  policy environment and in the macro-political context 
of ‘Europe’ influenced policy performance. 
 Using this simplified theoretical perspective I was able to answer three important 
questions concerning policy effectiveness: 1) how can policy instruments be identified, 
categorized, and analyzed? 2) which factors in the policy environment are most 
important for distilling the effectiveness of individual and multiple policy efforts? and  
3) how, and to what extent is policy performance contingent on factors associated with 
multilevel governance arrangements?   
Three research approaches were useful for conceptual development of dependent 
and explanatory factors, as well as empirical model-development: substantive case study 
 155
 
of tobacco policy; quantitative historical analysis of tobacco policy across time; and, 
quantitative analysis of tobacco control across space. By emphasizing post-decisional 
policy consequences (or, policy outcomes), a contribution was made to previous  
research orientations in tobacco control which focus mainly on policy development, 
adoption and diffusion. In order to simplify this study of public policy, a unified model 
was developed and utilized across multiple chapters, drawing on an instrumental view of 
policy effectiveness:  
 
O = ƒ (Policy,         [10] 
 Individual policy interventions 
 Multiple policy instruments 
 Scope of policy 
 Robust Contextual Factors,  
 Qualitative information on relevant factors  
  driven by policy arena 
 
 Policy Environment, 
 Bureaucratic Factors  
 Industry Factors 
 Interest-group Factors 
 Political Factors 
 Macro-Contextual Factors 
 Multilevel governance factors 
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 Supranational mandates, international treaties) 
 This model provided a parsimonious framework of thinking about public policy 
and performance. The configuration in which the model is used depends on the context 
in which it is applied. However, this model is also a useful framework for future 
quantitative, qualitative and formal research in the field of public policy, especially in 
comparative context. Further research should explore different functional forms and  
contingencies, as well as possible connections between this model and others in public 
policy, especially in policy  implementation and evaluation.  
 
Instrumental Theory of Policy Effectiveness: Evidence 
 A number of propositions were introduced in the beginning of the study. 
Hypotheses were then derived and tested, empirically. I find support for a number of 
these hypotheses. First, price and non-price policies are individually linked to reductions 
in cigarette consumption. However, when used in combination, their independent effects 
are diminished due to the demand-characteristics of the smoking population, which 
ranges from highly addicted to not addicted.  Increased bureaucratic capacity also 
improves consumption rates, while pluralist interest-group institutions, which favor the 
tobacco industry, lead to increases in consumption.  
 Simultaneous adoption of non-price tobacco policies requires a different strategy 
than expected. A measure of policy scope is developed that captures the collective 
attributes of non-price policies. When compared, price policies outperform non-price 
policy bundles, controlling for a number of factors in the environment.  
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 Further analysis reveals that policy performance in the tobacco control arena 
cannot be considered apart from pervasive strategies used by the tobacco industry to 
position themselves as important contributors in the larger economy. As tobacco 
manufacturing increases, so does consumption, even when controlling for other policies 
and factors in the policy environment. 
 Policy performance of member state regulatory efforts were also expected to be 
subject to political factors specific to the supranational arrangement of the Euroepan 
Union. The Treaty on European Union (TEU) expanded the policy competency of the 
European Union to include a number of social-regulatory matters, including public 
health. A supranational policy mandate for public health and tobacco control was 
established within the first pillar of TEU, and was buttressed by the framework-response 
of the Commission to priorities articulated in the TEU. The harmonization effect of this 
policy mandate allowed for potential efficiency-gains to be realized in efforts by 
member states to achieve policy goals.  It also established a super-state commitment to 
achieving tobacco control, of which a macro-incentive context of member state 
compliance was a part.  
  
Implications for Future Tobacco Control in the European Union 
 Numerous legislative measures have been adopted to control the production, 
manufacturing and consumption of tobacco since 2000 at the EU level. In addition to 
using directives, the Commission is managing a Tobacco Fund. The Tobacco Fund is a 
community-wide grant program that supports the research and dissemination of 
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information of the harmful effects of tobacco consumption, especially through 
manufactured cigarettes, whether active or passive (ETS). Another objective of the Fund 
is to improve the relevance of language and images used for health warning, posted on 
tobacco products (Aspect Consortium, 2004). Figure 9 shows several warning labels 
recently accepted into circulation across the Union. They are indicative of the widening 
and deepening of certain policy instruments used to control tobacco consumption:  
 
 
FIGURE 9 New European Union Labels for Tobacco Products 
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FIGURE 9 Continued. 
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FIGURE 9     Continued. 
 
Source: European Commission on Public Health (2006). 
 
  
 With support from the Tobacco Fund,  advertisements and warning labels are  
developed by experts in commercial advertising and the medical profession. In order 
implement the Fund’s public health objectives at the member state level, a system of 
interaction is developed between the regulatory body which manages the Fund and 
national authorities and relevant third-sector parties (European Commission on Public 
Health, 2006).  
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 Another instrument used to govern public health and control tobacco is 
supranational funding of international non-profit organizational networks, like the 
Euroepan Network for Smoking Prevention. ENSP is financed, in part, by the 
Commission and is tasked with coordinating activities of national coalitions, government 
officials, and professional experts specializing in smoking prevention and cessation 
(European Commission on Public Health, 2006). ENSP also serves in formal 
policymaking capacity by facilitating coherence among tobacco control policies at both 
national and European levels of governance. While the organization is governed by an 
elected board, the Commission is responsible for all management and coordination of the 
network.  
 Finally, the EU has become partner to the World Health Organization’s 
Framework Convention of Tobacco Control. The FCTC is the first ever international 
treaty on public health. The treaty articulates a set of principles and subsequent actions 
for countries world-wide to act against death and disease caused by smoking (European 
Commission on Public Health, 2006).  The EU took leadership in negotiating the treaty; 
and was among the first to see it ratified.  
 Each of these newly initiated policy instruments (the Tobacco Fund, co-optation 
of policy networks, and international cooperation) can be integrated into the general 
model above to improve understanding of policy performance, generally, and tobacco 
control, specifically, in the context of multilevel governance.  
 Finally, as the relationship between citizens and government evolves, this type of 
theoretical and empirical integration will become necessary, even common place, as 
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policy scholars recalibrate the meaning of ‘policy’ in negotiating governance between 
governments and societies and in facilitating democracy in the modern state. 
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